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ABSTRACT 
Weak, failing, failed and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and 
international security challenges of our day.  The stabilization and development of 
faltering states is in both the short- and long-term interests of the United States because 
stable states pose fewer security challenges.  Afghanistan is a failed state that presents 
security challenges on a global scale as well as a classic case study on insurgency that 
needs a strong counterinsurgency response. 
A successful counterinsurgency needs an explicit strategy for winning the trust 
and confidence of the local population.  Ultimately, the biggest problem is recognizing 
the importance of human terrain and understanding the population.  Currently, operations 
in Afghanistan are managed at the provincial level.  Only operations pushed down to the 
district and village level can capture these intricacies.  This is where and how lessons 
from the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program 
used in Vietnam apply. 
CORDS combined the previously separate civilian and military pacification 
efforts in Vietnam into one program and resulted in what may have been the only truly 
integrated civilian-military command in U.S. history. 
This thesis will assess the lessons learned from fighting a counterinsurgency in 
Vietnam via CORDS and how they apply in Afghanistan. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THESIS RELEVANCE 
Weak, fragile, failing, failed, collapsed, or post-conflict—no matter which term is 
currently en vogue to describe them, one truism remains constant: These states pose one 
of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day.  The problems 
these weak states create for the rest of the world are vast: “terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, organized crime, infectious disease, environmental degradation, and civil 
conflicts that spill over borders.”1  Stabilizing and developing (or reconstructing) failed 
states are in the short- and long-term interest of the United States (U.S.) because these 
states pose a threat to national interests and to the stability of entire regions. 
Afghanistan is a classic example of a failed state that presents security challenges 
on a global scale.  Fourteen years ago, Barnett Rubin wrote, “the continued turmoil in 
Afghanistan has already contributed to the civil war in Tajikistan, to authoritarianism in 
Uzbekistan, to growing Russian aggressiveness prompted by fear of Islam along Russia’s 
southern frontier, and to the dissemination of military skills to radical Islamists in South 
Asia and the Arab world.”2  Unfortunately, the story for Afghanistan has not changed 
much through the years.  Afghanistan currently ranks seventh on the 2009 “Failed State 
Index,”3 second on the 2008 “Index of State Weakness,”4 and 174 out of 178 countries on 
the United Nations’ 2005 Human Development Index.5 
                                                 
1 Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008), 3. 
2 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 280. 
3 The Fund for Peace, “2009 Failed State Index,” http://www.fundforpeace.org (accessed August 20, 
2009). 
4 Rice and Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing World. 
5 The UN has not been able to collect data in Afghanistan for a HDI assessment after 2005 due to the 
country’s poor security environment. UNDP, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007 (Islamabad: 
Army Press, 2007), 3. 
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In 2009, U.S. President Barak Obama stated the greatest threat to U.S. security is 
the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and has placed Afghanistan at 
the forefront of U.S. foreign policy.6  More troops, more aid workers, and more funding 
are all part of the U.S. plan to stabilize Afghanistan.  However, to win in Afghanistan 
entails much more than just fighting and defeating the Taliban.  U.S. leaders now 
understand military success is not sufficient to win.7  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
stated in November 2007 that it will take “economic development, institution-building 
and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic 
services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, 
strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients 
for long-term success.”8 
How does the international community define success in Afghanistan?  The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) issued its “strategic vision” for Afghanistan in 
April 2008.  Its objectives: “extremism and terrorism will no longer pose a threat to 
stability, Afghan National Security Forces will be in the lead and self-sufficient, and the 
Afghan National Government will be able to extend the reach of good governance, 
reconstruction, and development throughout the country to the benefit of all its citizens.”9 
This thesis proposes there is already a blueprint from our past for the international 
community to use to achieve success and win in Afghanistan.  This thesis will assess the 
lessons learned from fighting a counterinsurgency (COIN) in Vietnam.  More 
specifically, it will assess the relevance of the lessons from the Vietnam-era Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, (arguably the 
only truly integrated civilian-military program in U.S. history,) and if and how they can 
be applied in Afghanistan. 
                                                 
6 The White House, “U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/ (accessed January 27, 2009). 
7 Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Building a Basis for Success in Afghanistan,” Brookings (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0701_afghanistan_ohanlon.aspx?p=1 (accessed August 3, 2009). 
8 Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture, (Kansas State University),” November 26, 2007, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (accessed April 23, 2009). 




When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw that there was a lot of 
rubbish left over, bits and pieces and things that did not fit anywhere else.  
He collected them all together and threw them down on to the earth.  That 
was Afghanistan. 
        Afghan Mujahed10 
 
Afghanistan is arguably one of the few places in the world where its geography 
has greatly impacted its history, politics and people.11  Many have tried to conquer this 
rugged land (i.e., Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan) and many have failed.  Afghan 
history is marred with conflict, from internal civil wars between the various tribes and 
ethnic groups to wars against large empires (British and Soviets.)  Afghanistan is slightly 
smaller than the state of Texas, is landlocked and has a terrain that is rugged, arid, and 
deserted.  The massive Hindu Kush mountain range splits the country in two and 
separates the North from the South.  However, interlopers have long had an interest in the 
area, primarily because of its geo-strategic position relative to trade and migration routes.  
It truly is where the East meets the West and it has been labeled the center of the world.12 
The Afghan people are just as rugged and diverse as its terrain.  The vast majority 
of Afghanistan’s 33.6 million13 people are located in the rural areas, their livelihoods are 
largely based in agriculture, and the majority of the adult population is uneducated and 
illiterate.  Due to decades of war, the country lacks any real infrastructure and modern 
development.  There are seven main ethno-linguistic groups in Afghanistan, with the 
majority being Pashtun, two official languages (Dari and Pashto), over 30 minor 
languages and a multitude of dialects.  To add to the complexity, Afghans, especially  
 
                                                 
10 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2001), 7. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Population data is a July 2009 estimate from the CIA World Factbook Web site, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed August 20, 2009). 
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Pashtuns, have historically been a tribal society, putting their trust and faith in Islam 
instead of their government.  Pashtuns are used to living their lives in accordance with 
Pashtunwali and solving problems at their own level through their own means.14 
David Edwards suggests we need to delve deeper below what appears on the 
surface to really understand Afghanistan, its people and all of its complexities.  He 
writes: 
Afghanistan’s central problem was Afghanistan itself, specifically certain 
profound moral contradictions that have inhibited the country from 
forging a coherent civil society.  These contradictions are deeply rooted in 
Afghan culture, but they have come to the fore in the last one hundred 
years, since the advent of the nation-state, the laying down of permanent 
borders, and the attempt to establish an extensive state bureaucracy and to 
invest that bureaucracy with novel forms of authority and control.15 
The aforementioned dynamics seem to suggest that it is in the best interest of the 
entire international community to stabilize Afghanistan and provide an avenue for the 
Afghan people to take control of their country and their lives, but it has to be on Afghan 
terms.  Currently, the situation in Afghanistan is precarious: U.S. and coalition forces 
have been in-country since late 2001, the border region between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan is tumultuous and still a safe haven for terrorists, and the Taliban has gained 
a considerable amount of strength, especially in the South and East.  In fact, top U.S. 
leaders have recently said the U.S. is “not winning” in Afghanistan.16  Afghan’s have 
                                                 
14 Pashtunwali is an unwritten, but universally understood, social code for the Pashtun people. For 
more information on the concept of Pashtunwali, see: Thomas J. Barfield, “Weapons of the not so Weak in 
Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War & Peace,” paper 
presented at the Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series “Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: 
Transactions and Identities, Yale University, February 23, 2007; Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, 
“No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security 
32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 58–64. 
15 David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Ages: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996), 216. 
16 For U.S. President Barak Obama’s statement see: Helene Cooper and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Obama 
Ponders Outreach to Elements of the Taliban,” New York Times, March 8, 2009, A1. For COMISAF, 
General David McKiernan’s statement, see: “Forces ‘not winning’ in Afghanistan,” The Evening Standard 
(March 9, 2009), http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23659425-
details/Forces+%27+in+Afghanistan/article.do (accessed August 21, 2009); For the U.S. Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen’s statement, see: “Top U.S. Advisor ‘not convinced we’re 
winning’ in Afghanistan,” AFP (September 10, 2008), 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jBUdWbynAQ1qeP_bONUaVdcJykkg (accessed August 21, 2009). 
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been supportive of the Americans, but their patience is wearing thin.  Strategy has to 
focus efforts on providing tangible results that impact the daily lives of the average 
Afghan at the local level.  The Afghan people also need a secure environment to operate 
in before they can truly begin to take control and rebuild their lives. 
In his speech announcing the new, comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan in March 2009, President Obama said if the Taliban gained control of the 
Afghan government, the country would again be a base for al Qaeda and other terrorists.  
The clear and focused goal is “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”17 
Afghanistan’s ills are not something that can or will be improved by the 
intervention of foreign, conventional military forces or through massive fire power and 
advanced weaponry.  Rather, Afghanistan represents a classic case study on a “hybrid” 
insurgency that needs to be met with a strong COIN strategy.18 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
While the specific questions raised by this thesis will relate to the relevance of 
CORDS to COIN in Afghanistan, a series of ancillary questions will also be raised.  Is 
our military, and more importantly, is our nation prepared for the type of challenges that 
are posed by a “hybrid” insurgency in Afghanistan?  What is the optimal composition of 
force structure for COIN in Afghanistan?  What is the relative role of foreign security 
forces versus indigenous, Afghan security forces?  More specifically, what is the role of 
U.S., International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and NATO forces versus the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), mainly the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
Afghan National Police (ANP)?  What is the right mix of kinetic and non-kinetic power 
in a COIN?  Probably the most important question of all is how important is the 
perceived legitimacy of a country’s regime?  For a COIN to be successful, the regime in 
                                                 
17 The White House, “A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (March 27, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed 
August 21, 2009). 
18 Harald Havoll, COIN Revisited: Lessons of the Classical Literature on Counterinsurgency and its 
Applicability to the Afghan Hybrid Insurgency, NUPI Report, Security in Practice no. 13, 2008, 20–28. 
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power needs to be viewed as lawful and valid.19  What are the implications of the elected 
leadership in Afghanistan under President Hamid Kharzai being viewed as illegitimate by 
Afghans outside of Kabul? 
For a COIN to be successful there has to be an explicit strategy for winning the 
trust and confidence of the local population.20  Ultimately, the biggest problem is 
recognizing the importance of human terrain and knowing a population’s wishes, desires 
and fissures.  Currently, operations in Afghanistan are managed at the provincial level.  
Only operations pushed down to the local level (i.e., district and village) can capture 
these intricacies.  This is where and how lessons from CORDS will apply. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis represents a comparative, historical case study of Vietnam and 
Afghanistan.  Lessons, both positive and negative, associated with the CORDS program 
in the Vietnam War will be explored and applied to Afghanistan.  A particular focus of 
this thesis will be prognostications concerning the impact a CORDS-like program would 
have on COIN in Afghanistan. 
This study will use both primary and secondary sources concerning COIN in 
Afghanistan and Vietnam.  A particularly useful source of data will be based on the after 
action reports of officers who have recently served as Provincial Reconstruction Team 
commanders in Afghanistan.  Also, data from field research gathered by Professor 
Thomas H. Johnson and his team from the Naval Postgraduate School will be used to 
augment and support recommendations.  This information will be complemented by other 
data gathered by international organizations, non-governmental organizations and the 
military. 
                                                 
19 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 85, no. 3 (May-June 2005): 
9; Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Democracy in Afghanistan is Wishful Thinking,” The 
Christian Science Monitor (August 20, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0820/p09s01-coop.html 
(accessed August 20, 2009). 
20 In the U.S., we often hear talk about “hearts and minds” programs. This thesis will argue the more 
correct terminology should be trust and confidence and that the “hearts and minds” concept is nonsense. 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis will present a historical case study of the CORDS program in Vietnam 
and recommend how lessons learned from that program can impact current stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.  This thesis is divided into five chapters.  
Chapter I is a basic introduction to the research question, hypothesis and its relevance.  
Chapter II represents a literature review of COIN in Vietnam and Afghanistan.  Chapter 
III presents a case study of the CORDS program in Vietnam, focusing on successes and 
problems associated with a counterinsurgency.  Chapter IV applies the lessons presented 
in Chapter III to the current situation in Afghanistan.  Chapter V presents policy 
recommendations, suggested areas for further study, and the conclusion of the thesis. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide the official Joint Publication definition of COIN, 
insurgency, and other terminology used in Stability Operations and contemplate if those 
definitions really capture what is happening in Afghanistan today.  Within the definitions 
section, it will explore the various opinions on the U.S. military’s role in nation-building 
and which government agency should best do these tasks.  The chapter will then focus on 
COIN strategy and compare and contrast the classic COIN theorists versus the 
contemporary COIN supporters and determine what is actually needed in Afghanistan.  A 
critical focus of this chapter will be examining why the population and legitimacy are so 
vital for a COIN’s success.  The chapter will conclude with an exploration of the use of 
conventional tactics in COIN, the role of intelligence and the need for a combined, multi-
agency effort. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions are from the current Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. 
• Counterinsurgency (COIN)—those military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to 
defeat insurgency 
• Insurgency—an organized movement aimed at the overthrown of a 
constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict 
Does this JP definition of an insurgency accurately reflect who we are fighting in 
Afghanistan today?  Some insurgents may have political objectives to disrupt the 
government and others are probably satisfied with just participating in the jihad.21  Chris 
North argues a better definition to describe what we are fighting would be the broader 
category of conflict known as irregular warfare.22 
                                                 
21 David Kilcullen, “Counter-insurgency Redux,” Survival 48 (Winter 2006-07): 115–116. 
22 Chris North, “Redefining Insurgency,” Military Review 88, no. 1 (January/February 2008): 117. 
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• Irregular warfare (IW)—a violent struggle among states and non-state 
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).  
Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it 
may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to 
erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. 
North suggests a more accurate definition for COIN would be “those military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government 
to combat irregular warfare and promote stability operations.”23  The following sections 
utilize North’s recommended definition. 
1. Nation-building24 
Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley write in the foreword of The U.S. Army 
Stability Operations Field Manual that the U.S. military will face three core challenges in 
the future: “Rising tensions in the global commons, hybrid forms of warfare, and threats 
posed by weak and failing states.”25  This suggests U.S. military forces need to be 
prepared for more than just fighting and winning conventional wars.  The Field Manual 
indirectly proposes that U.S. policy makers need to break down and officially add nation-
building skills to the U.S. military’s repertoire.  Francis Fukuyama points out since the 
end of the Cold War, the U.S. has: 
 
 
                                                 
23 North, “Redefining Insurgency,” 118. 
24 The terms “nation-building” and “state-building” are often used interchangeably in literature. For 
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Taken on roughly one new nation-building commitment every other 
year…We have been in denial about it, but we are in this business for the 
long haul.  We’d better get used to it, and learn how to do it—because 
there will almost certainly be a next time.26 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates concurs.  He has stated, “Our future conflicts are 
likely to look like the current ones, it is high time we stopped muddling through and got 
serious about learning how to operate in environments other than conventional high tech 
peer-to-peer combat.”27 
Nation-building (or state-building) skills are normally considered as belonging to 
civilian institutions (i.e., Department of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), etc.)  U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has explicitly 
highlighted development as “an equal partner, along with defense and diplomacy,” in 
advancing U.S. national security.28 However, the reality is the U.S. military fills the 
development gap since U.S. civilian agencies do not have anywhere near the capacity 
needed to conduct state-building tasks in post-conflict environments and other 
stabilization and reconstruction situations. 
The counter-argument is the U.S. Army is currently too focused on COIN and 
realistically, our future conflicts (i.e., Iran or North Korea) will not involve the need for 
“winning hearts and minds,” but a reliance on conventional tactics.29  Moreover, for a 
COIN to be successful, it involves a “wholesale societal transformation” which is not 
something that necessarily serves the national interests of the U.S., especially when it 
involves the military.30  The U.S. just needs to stay out of situations where COIN is the 
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main strategy and let someone else take the lead.  After all, the role of the U.S. Army is 
to fight and win the nation’s wars, not win hearts and minds.  Moreover, when 
democracies adopt a nation-building strategy, it actually creates more targets, incentives 
and opportunities for terrorism.31 
This counter-argument is flawed for several reasons.  First, the world we live in is 
getting smaller and flatter.32  Globalization and technology have made geographical 
borders almost irrelevant.  In this highly interwoven, interdependent, global society we 
live in, it is in our national interest to ensure weak and failing states are stabilized before 
they become failed states and create further chaos in their region of the world.  It is by far 
less costly to be engaged early, PRIOR to the need for military intervention.33  “A safe 
and secure environment for people in all communities and states is an essential condition 
for sustainable economic, political, and social development, and conflict mitigation.”34  
Moreover, our economy continues to grow and thrive when we have a variety of stable 
trading partners throughout the world. 
Second, the best way of confronting non-state actors or multinational threats is 
through a confluence of “diplomatic engagement, law enforcement tactics, civilian 
development agencies, democracy and good governance promotion and in some cases, 
our armed forces.”35  Even more important than all this, we need to ensure these threats 
are confronted via a unified coalition, not unilaterally.  More often than not, the U.S. 
perceives security threats in military terms and chooses to respond with force.  We need  
 
                                                 
31 Gary T. Dempsey, “Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation Building to Combat Terrorism,” Cato 
Institute, Policy Analysis 429 (March 21, 2002), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa429.pdf (accessed 
November 19, 2008). 
32 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (New York: 
Picador, 2007). 
33 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War 
(Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper, Centre for the Study of African Economies, March 26, 2004), 
http://www.uib.es/depart/deaweb/smed/pdf/collier.pdf (accessed August 25, 2009). 
34 Nicole J. Ball, “Strengthening Democratic Governance of the Security Sector in Conflict Affected 
Countries,” Public Administration and Development 25 (Winter 2005): 25. 
35 Michael Cohen, “The Future of the U.S. Military,” Democracy Arsenal (March 23, 2009), 
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2009/03/the-future-of-the-us-military.html (accessed August 24, 2009). 
 13
to develop our civilian development capacity so that the military is not the primary tool in 
our kit for confronting security challenges.  Moreover, the military should not be the lead 
agent in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.36 
Stabilization and reconstruction is an evolving concept that is most commonly 
considered as the “intersection of military-led stability operations and civilian-led 
reconstruction activities...Reconstruction activities include all aspects of improving 
governance: training civil administrators, improving essential services and public safety, 
supporting civil society and self-determination, and promoting the rule of law and 
economic development.”37  JP 01-2 defines stability operations as “an overarching term 
encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the 
United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or 
reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, 
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”38 
To summarize, according to the JP definitions, we are engaged in IW in 
Afghanistan.  The key words in the IW definition that need to be highlighted are 
legitimacy and the population.  Furthermore, COIN is a combination of offensive, 
defensive and stability operations.39  Stability operations include skills outside of 
conventional tactics and rely on strong relationships with civilian development agencies.  
As stated earlier, development equates to nation-building.  Therefore, if the U.S. is going 
to employ a solid COIN strategy, we must have a paradigm shift from conventional 
priorities and its emphasis on massive weapons systems to enhancing capabilities for 
stability operations. 
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C. COIN STRATEGY: CLASSIC VS CONTEMPORARY 
The central argument of this thesis is that the Vietnam CORDS model has lessons 
and implications for Afghanistan’s COIN strategy.  Military historian Andrew Birtle 
suggests, “the best preparation officers can have for … duty, barring personal experience, 
is to study previous historical situations to sensitize themselves to the kinds of dilemmas 
that counter-guerrilla, civil affairs, and contingency operations typically pose.”40 
However, which previous historical situations should we be studying?  The 
classicists focus on revolutionary warfare from the 1950s and 1960s and the key theorists 
include David Galula, Robert Thompson, Bernard Fall, and Frank Kitson.  They all 
propose a common set of key principles and practices that have emerged over time.  
Frank Hoffman minimizes these classical principles as mere “blatant flashes of the 
obvious, such as Robert Thompson’s somber advice “the government must have an 
overall plan.””41  Nevertheless, if it were so easy and obvious, then why are we eight 
years into Afghanistan and still “not winning?”  Inject Clausewitz’ maxim:  “Everything 
in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy.”42  Still, 
others argue we would be better off focusing on internal conflicts from the 1990s (i.e., 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Columbia, Bosnia, Congo, and Kosovo) since these provide a more 
realistic insight into current insurgencies.43 
Historically, most rural-based insurgencies have started with a large peasant 
population and are fueled by a Maoist or Marxist-Leninist ideology.44  When the extreme 
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ideology is religious-based, it adds another dimension to its complexity.45  Is it even 
possible to devise a strategy to fight a group whose logic and rationality is rooted in 
religion?  Unfortunately, the role of religion is glossed over in the current COIN Field 
Manual (FM).  It seems U.S. policy makers have yet to embrace Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilizations theory: Conflicts will no longer be primarily ideological or economic, but 
rather along cultural lines, specifically between Christianity and Islam.46  Instead, the 
U.S. is often more aligned with Fukuyama’s End of History theory, assuming free market 
economies and liberal democracies will universally be accepted if just given the chance.47  
Graham Fuller paints a more realistic picture with his statement: “Muslims firmly believe 
that the present meltdown of international financial order vindicates their belief that 
Western focus upon market efficiency, market freedom, and minimalization of market 
controls is precisely what the Islamic order fears.”48  A jihadist that is willing to blow 
himself up for the reward of martyrdom is probably not going to be won over by a 
government-sponsored reconstruction program. 
The U.S. Army’s own COIN FM seems conflicted between classical theory and 
contemporary lessons.  The second paragraph in the foreword reads:  
You cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic extremists the same way 
you would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros: the 
application of principles and fundamentals to deal with each varies 
considerably.  Nonetheless, all insurgencies, even today’s highly adaptable 
strains, remain wars amongst the people.  They use variations of standard 
themes and adhere to elements of a recognizable revolutionary campaign 
plan.49 
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Throughout the entire FM, there are examples of melding the traditional approaches with 
the realities of globalization and religious extremism.  It is this merger of the past and the 
present that could be categorized as “neo-classical counterinsurgency.”50  Simply put, we 
need to use classical COIN principles, but we need to adapt them to the realities of the 
current situation.  Specific to Afghanistan, Harald Havoll proposes there are elements of 
a classical insurgency, but only to a certain extent.  Afghanistan’s insurgency is more 
evolved and complex and Havoll refers to it as a “hybrid insurgency.”51 
It is true that today’s insurgencies differ significantly from those of the 1960s.  
Today’s insurgents are not always necessarily seeking to overthrow a state and instead of 
Marxist-Leninist ideals, they use religious extremism as their recruiting platform.  
Afghanistan is even more complex because there are multiple insurgencies competing 
within the state.  However, even with all this, it still comes down to one critical element: 
the population.  The population always has been and always will be the center of gravity.  
So, no matter what label we put on the insurgency—classic, contemporary, religious, 
neo-classical, or hybrid—the key to success is ultimately controlling the population. 
1. Population is the Center of Gravity 
All COIN literature agrees the population is the key and gaining control over it is 
the center of gravity for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.  To be clear, this 
concept is about much more than just gaining the support of the population because this 
is by no means a popularity contest.  What people think and what people do are two 
totally different things.  The population may like the counterinsurgent (i.e., government, 
coalition forces, etc.), but they will not support the counterinsurgent due to lack of 
control over the political space.52 
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The only thing that makes it possible for insurgents to survive and expand is the 
participation of the population.53  However, participation should not be confused with 
sympathy.  In areas where the state has proven it cannot protect its people, the population 
sometimes has no choice but to support the insurgent.  The insurgent lives and works in 
the population, publically eliminates rivals, intimidates potential ones and scares the rest 
of the population into being quiet.  The insurgent does not need the “support, sympathy, 
or loyalty of the people, not even a significant minority” of the population for them to be 
able to operate.54  They can operate and succeed with only 2% of the population actively 
supporting them, as long as the other 98% is passive.55 
Gaining the population’s trust and confidence is first step towards control.  The 
phrase heard most often to describe this in COIN is “hearts and minds.”56  Dr. David 
Kilcullen, one of the world’s experts on guerilla warfare who has helped revamp the U.S. 
military strategy in Afghanistan, describes “hearts” as persuading people that their 
interests are served by your success and describes “minds” as convincing them that you 
can protect them and that resisting you is pointless.  Neither concept has to do anything 
with getting people to like you.57  What you are really trying to do in this situation is gain 
the local populace’s trust and confidence.  When the population trusts your motives and 
has confidence in your ability to provide a secure environment, they will start to 
understand that their self-interest is best served by you and not the insurgents.  Once the 
counterinsurgent gains the population’s trust and confidence, the insurgent starts to lose  
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the population’s support, their support network then starts to break down, and they 
become more vulnerable.  However, the counterinsurgent must prove as early as possible 
to the population they have the will, the means, and the ability to win.58 
2. Legitimacy 
The ultimate success of COIN depends on building and securing the legitimacy of 
the indigenous government.59  According to the COIN manual, the desired end state of a 
COIN is “establishing legitimacy and gaining popular support for the host nation 
government.”60  On the flipside, governments that are considered corrupt and inept by its 
people are ripe for take over either through rebellion or revolution.61  This was why the 
South Vietnamese Government (GVN) failed once the U.S. forces left Vietnam and is 
currently the problem in Afghanistan today.  The U.S.-backed central government of each 
country could not stand on its own without support. 
In Vietnam, the U.S. supported bureaucrats, elites, and intellectuals and 
disregarded about 85% of the South Vietnamese population.62  Once CORDS was 
implemented, it made progress in the rural areas, but the GVN was never able to 
capitalize on the progress because they were fatally out of touch with their own people.63  
CORDS was able to get corrupt GVN province chiefs removed, but the Saigon 
government continued to retain and even promote inept officials.  Their political system 
was based on loyalty, not competence, and the Vietnamese people saw through this.64  
Henry Kissinger said in 1969, “We are so powerful that Hanoi is simply unable to defeat 
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us militarily.  By its own efforts, Hanoi cannot force the withdrawal of American forces 
from South Vietnam….Unfortunately, our military strength has no political corollary; we 
have been unable so far to create a political structure that could survive military 
opposition from Hanoi after we withdraw.”65 
The current situation in Afghanistan is similar to that of Vietnam described above.  
Although the main goal of the insurgency in Afghanistan is not to overthrow the 
government, the incompetence and corruption of the central government are accelerants 
that fuel the fire.  The Afghan people have grown disillusioned with democracy these 
past eight years.  They saw warlords and commanders co-opted after the Bonn 
Agreement and continue to watch corrupt government officials get richer by lining their 
pockets with foreign aid that never reaches the average Afghan.66 
The international community seems intent on turning Afghanistan into a liberal 
democracy without taking into account its history, culture, or traditions.67  Roland Paris 
argues that peace-building as a whole is too focused on holding elections before the 
institutions that enable an elected government to fulfill its governance functions are in 
place and capable.68  Afghanistan is a case study for this concept and the low voter turn-
out for the August 2009 Presidential elections should raise red flags.  The vast majority of 
Afghans are frustrated by the “democratization process that has brought them little but an 
abstract illusion.  With growing suspicion about the magical power of democracy, the 
concept itself is increasingly challenged as a pretext for Western intervention that bears 
little resemblance to the idea of participation and public accountability.”69 
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Democratic mechanisms have to be adapted to the particular needs of a 
community, not the community to an ideal of a democratic system.  
Legitimacy is key to building sustainable peace, and this legitimacy comes 
not from the timetable of donors with blueprints of post-conflict 
reconstruction, but from the points of view of the population.70 
3. Conventional Tactics 
To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. 
        Sun Tzu71 
Robert Komer, the first leader of the CORDS program, foreshadowed events in 
Afghanistan when he warned the U.S. would encounter rural insurgencies in the future 
and must heed the lessons of Vietnam.  Firepower and high technology are not always the 
best way to win wars in certain areas of the world, but it is what the U.S. military is 
trained and equipped to do.72  The U.S. military needs to adapt to meet the challenges of 
IW.  However, is it possible to change the culture of an organization—“Big Army”—that 
prides itself on massive firepower and direct attacks? 
A retired U.S. Army officer who is considered an expert in COIN, John A. Nagl, 
compares the U.S. and British forces and their responses to counterinsurgency in his 
book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.  Nagl critiques the U.S. Army for continuing to 
train in conventional warfare tactics and its failure to learn from the Vietnam War where 
it relied too much on conventional strategy and tactics.  To further cloud matters, there 
are still proponents to this day who believe Vietnam could have been won through the  
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application of more military power.73  The fact is in Vietnam, the Army continued to 
stick with a high-cost, low-payoff strategy by ignoring the political and social dimensions 
that form the foundations of COIN.74 
The difference between conventional warfare and unconventional warfare is so 
great, that if an army is trained to be very successful in one type of conflict, they will 
have a very hard time adapting to other types of conflict.75  In fact, a counterinsurgent 
force actually needs capabilities much closer to the insurgent’s.  Nathan Leites and 
Charles Wolf, Jr. write: “Mobility, reconnaissance, police (rather than military) 
intelligence, a capacity for operating effectively in small units, and police and 
paramilitary forces are the important military elements for deterring or meeting the threat 
of insurgents—not armor, artillery, jet aircraft, and large centralized operations by large 
divisional units.”76  A counterinsurgent needs the ability to operate quickly, decisively 
and have the uncanny ability to adapt and learn throughout the campaign.  A COIN is not 
merely a fight against an enemy’s military forces and it is very different from short, 
intense war.  The objective is not to destroy an enemy, but rather to provide security for 
local residents so they feel safe and secure in going about their daily lives.  The only way 
for a COIN force to positively impact the security situation for the village and the 
population they are trying to protect is through accurate and timely intelligence. 
4. Role of Intelligence 
Effective and efficient action in COIN requires timely and reliable information.  
Both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent need information to make advances.  Since 
the insurgent lives and works among the population, they start with the information  
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advantage.  This information advantage is even more pronounced in less-developed 
countries (i.e., Afghanistan.)77 The insurgent is able to firmly establish themselves and 
build their base before the counterinsurgent even learns about them. 
Collectively, the population has all the information the counterinsurgent needs to 
take the advantage.  Therefore, an intelligence program that is focused more on the 
human and cultural terrain versus a heavy reliance on SECRET/NO FOREIGN data will 
be better equipped to exploit the population.78 
Andrew Krepinevich criticizes the Army’s intelligence failures in Vietnam 
because it never embraced the necessity to destroy the Viet Cong’s political infrastructure 
as a precursor for victory.  Army Intelligence officers did not think understanding the 
Vietnamese culture, language and history was important to their duties because their 
focus was on the enemy order of battle.79 
Just like Vietnam, the lack of understanding Afghan culture, history and language 
hampers the international efforts.  For example, Afghans value age and social status.  
This places junior officers and young civilians at a disadvantage culturally when they are 
out in the field.80  Although we may not be able to age our force in the field, we can 
enhance their cultural knowledge base and language skills. 
It is also critical to understand the social networks of an environment to determine 
who has the most potential influence over the insurgents.  Kilcullen encourages co-opting 
indigenous women through targeted social and economic programs to build one’s own 
female counterinsurgency.  He states, “win the women, and you own the family unit.  
Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population.”81 
Intelligence is critical for any military operation, but intelligence supporting a 
COIN cannot be based on data that is found on SECRET platforms.  For one, the 
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information cannot be readily shared with coalition and Afghan partners.  Secondly, the 
information is usually not even relevant or applicable to the localized area of operations.  
The focus needs to be on gathering data on the local insurgent and that can only be 
gained from interactions with the village population.82 
5. Combined Effort 
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to COIN and every situation will require 
different tactics because it has to be adapted to the local situation.  However, a successful 
COIN strategy should always put the local population first and plan on working with a 
multitude of agencies.  Kilcullen describes counterinsurgency as “armed social work.”83  
In COIN, working on social and political issues are the crux of the mission.  This is 
where relationships with inter-agency partners and indigenous actors are crucial.  The 
military’s “role is to provide protection, identify needs, facilitate civil affairs and use 
improvements in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the 
population.”84  The ultimate goal is for the population to take the lead and start making 
decisions that impact their villages and families. 
Further evidence of the importance of involving the local population is found in a 
comparative study of two towns in a post-conflict environment.  Anne Holohan proposes 
that local populations should be “treated with greater inclusiveness and respect--as full 
partners--because they are truly the key to the long-term success of an intervention.  
Without their participation and cooperation, the efforts of the international organizations 
will come to nothing.”85  She also finds that, “the problem or challenge of providing 
security and of facilitating a democratic transition and of reconstructing the society is too 
big for any one hierarchical organization.”86  The bottom line is that no one agency can  
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perform complex stability operations on their own.  There must be inter-agency 
cooperation and coordination, as well as close involvement from the local population, for 
there to be long-term sustainability. 
A strategy of close involvement from the local population is pursued by Greg 
Mortenson.  His organization empowers indigenous people to be fully involved in every 
aspect of building a school for their community.  This creates a sense of ownership and 
pride in the project.  As a result, of the 80 plus schools his organization has helped build, 
only one has been attacked by the Taliban.  Mortenson stated in the village where the 
school was attacked, the people have vowed to find the individuals responsible and hold 
them accountable.  He is a firm believer that the reason why more of the schools have not 
been attacked is due to the power of village consensus and the fact they have promised to 
protect the schools with their lives.87 
These examples suggest in order for a COIN to succeed, there has to be a plan to 
work together with civilian agencies, learn what is important to the local population, get 
them to take ownership of their village and be willing to protect it, at all costs, against the 
insurgents. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter suggests the JP definition of IW best captures what is currently 
taking place in Afghanistan and recommends the COIN definition be updated to include 
IW and stability operations.  Stability operations include a wide range of skills that fall 
outside the scope of the U.S. military.  Civilian agencies are paramount to nation-building 
and their capacity has to be enhanced if they are ever going to be used effectively. 
Regardless of what label is put on the insurgency in Afghanistan, the U.S. needs 
to re-examine its counterinsurgency strategy and make building trust and confidence 
among the indigenous population the top priority.  There is a “symbiotic relationship 
between the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and rural civilians” in Afghanistan and the international 
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efforts need to be focused down to the district and village level.88  The U.S. is making the 
same mistakes the Soviets did by holding the urban centers and focusing on establishing a 
strong, central government in Kabul.  If the international community does not gain a 
better understanding of the nature of the conflict, we will continue to make decisions and 
pursue operational objectives that harbor resentment and instill fear among those in the 
local population that we need on our side. 
This chapter points out the importance of winning the trust and confidence of the 
population and in order to achieve long-term success, local civilians and inter-agency 
groups must be incorporated into a stability operations network.  Finding a way to 
involve the indigenous population and effectively cooperate with a multitude of civilian 
organizations is the path to success in Afghanistan.  This thesis proposes CORDS leads 
us towards that passageway.  From interagency cooperation and coordination to village 
level reconstruction efforts, while CORDS will not provide the turn-key solution for 
Afghanistan, it offers concepts and ideas worth exploring. 
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III. CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY 
DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will serve mainly as a historical review of the Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support89 (CORDS) program, focusing on the time period 
just before and after its implementation in 1967.  It will provide a background on how the 
U.S. viewed the threat posed by the Viet Cong (VC) prior to 1967 and the U.S. Army’s 
approach to COIN in comparison to the overall war effort, which was based solidly in 
conventional strategy.  The chapter will then discuss pacification and provide an 
explanation on what the U.S. was trying to accomplish in Vietnam with these programs.  
The chapter will then explore the decisions behind putting a civilian in charge of CORDS 
and making him a vice to the Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, and 
the subsequent results of putting a civilian in the military chain-of-command.  It will then 
delve into Project TAKEOFF, the action program Robert Komer implemented to kick-
start CORDS on a national level.  Finally, the chapter will extrapolate four macro-level 
lessons from CORDS that can be applied to the current effort in Afghanistan. 
During the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. was essentially fighting two different wars: 
the first was a conventional war against the North Vietnamese forces and the second was 
an insurgency war against VC guerrillas in rural South Vietnam.  There are countless 
studies and pieces of work examining the U.S.’s performance in the conventional war.  
This chapter focuses on “the other war” and explores why the CORDS program was the 
most effective counterinsurgency weapon used against the VC. 
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There were numerous pacification programs90 attempted in Vietnam prior to 
CORDS.  These programs were initiated and conducted by both the South Vietnamese 
government and the United States.  Although the programs were different in name, they 
all had two main goals: 1) protect the rural population from the insurgents and 2) meet 
the rural population’s needs through various aid and infrastructure support programs.  
The crux was to ultimately generate support for the Saigon regime.  As Dale Andrade 
explains, “the machinery for extending pacification consisted of various small and 
diverse programs run by every conceivable civilian agency in South Vietnam; the effort 
was getting nowhere.  Those involved in pacification had neither the resources nor the 
leverage to prompt … action.”91  More critical to their downfall than the lack of unity and 
coordination of effort, none of the programs could provide reliable security for the 
population they were trying to assist. 
Just like in Afghanistan today, the insurgents did not just target military forces, 
but attacked “school teachers and health workers, the village chiefs and agricultural 
workers, the literate and those who would lead Vietnam towards social justice and 
modernization.”92  Life in rural Vietnam was susceptible to insecurity, poverty, low 
health standards, lack of opportunity, social injustice, and land inequities.  The VC easily 
exploited the rural population’s feelings of alienation from the central government.93  The  
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CORDS program was a collective and coordinated attempt to provide country-wide 
security, eliminate VC terror and intimidation, and produce constructive change in the 
lives of the rural people. 
B. VIET CONG ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO 1965 
It is important to understand Washington’s sense of the VC threat prior to sending 
conventional forces over in mid-1965.  Before President John F. Kennedy took office in 
1961, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published in August 1959 suggested that 
there would probably be no existential crisis for the foreseeable future in Vietnam.  
However, the reality on the ground was a very different story: the South Vietnamese 
President, Ngo Dinh Diem, was viewed as unpopular, the South’s economy was not 
developing like the North’s, and Diem’s government was under pressure from guerrillas 
(VC) supported from the North.  The NIE reported the North would continue to support 
the VC, but an “overt invasion seemed most unlikely.”94 The situation in Vietnam was 
“unhappy, but not unstable.”95  Even through the end of 1961, classified reports showed 
an increase in VC strength and activity in the Vietnamese countryside, which culminated 
with a failed military coup to overthrow Diem in November 1960.  However, regardless 
of how dire the situation actually was on the ground, an optimistic view was always 
briefed to U.S. policymakers, even by those who personally authored the original 
reports!96 
President Kennedy and his administration eventually realized more action was 
required and in October 1961, sent a team of high-level military and civilian officials to 
Saigon to develop a counterinsurgency plan for South Vietnam.  General Maxwell Taylor 
offered compelling reasons on why the U.S. should stay out of Vietnam,97 but also 
suggested an increase in the number of American advisors in-country and to send several 
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Army battalions of engineer, signal, and medical troops with enough infantry to protect 
them.98  President Kennedy agreed and believed the increase in advisors would directly 
improve South Vietnamese military performance and provide a new source of 
intelligence.99 
After further review of the team’s recommendations, President Kennedy took 
steps to focus U.S. government attention on pacification.  The Kennedy administration 
wanted a national security strategy that was less about massive retaliation and provided a 
more flexible response, especially to threats of insurgencies.  The administration viewed 
counterinsurgency as a way to assist allies in wars of national liberation.  To move 
towards this more flexible U.S. security strategy, the U.S. Army needed to be proficient 
in counterinsurgency tactics.100 
Unfortunately, the U.S. Army was not receptive to President Kennedy’s push for 
a strong counterinsurgency program.  Rather than expanding their Special Forces 
program, whose specialty was already counterinsurgency, the army assigned these 
counterinsurgency missions to existing combat divisions that were already fighting in a 
conventional mode.  These units viewed counterinsurgency as an unwelcomed additional 
duty.  “The army did little to alter its force structure to meet the special requirements of 
counterinsurgency.”101 
Despite President Kennedy’s desire, the army never revised their 
counterinsurgency doctrine before sending troops to South Vietnam in 1965.102  The 
army entered Vietnam with a conventional war doctrine that was well suited for any 
battle in Europe.  U.S. Army doctrine was based on Antoin-Henri Jomini’s Napoleonic  
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art of war theory: the object of warfare is the destruction of the enemy’s forces.  This 
dogma was so ingrained in the army’s culture and top leadership that they disregarded 
any suggestions that called for a more appropriate counterinsurgency technique. 
After two years of conventional fighting, the army made no fundamental changes 
in its counterinsurgency doctrine when it published a new Field Manual (FM 31-16) on 
Counter-guerrilla Operations in March 1967.103  Counterinsurgency was a duty added to 
the regular combat mission of divisions and brigades, but there were no changes in 
organizational structure nor any scaling down of firepower in fighting an insurgency.  
The manual did suggest the customs, activities, and well-being of the people be disturbed 
as little as possible, but the brigade was to use all weapons and equipment necessary to 
defeat the enemy.  There was no call for increased mobility, lighter weapons or smaller 
units.  Furthermore, it gave the commander wide discretion in interpreting the 
directive.104  In reality, the new manual made no impact on tactical operations. 
To improve coordination among the U.S. government agencies, President 
Kennedy formed an ad hoc special group for counterinsurgency composed of the heads of 
Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department (DOS), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the National 
Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  
Unfortunately, the group could never decide whether political or military measures 
deserved priority: some argued that programs to win political loyalty had to be first 
because that was a prerequisite for establishing security while others argued it was 
impossible to win the loyalty of people who were being exploited by the VC.  Moreover, 
the two main players, the DoD and the DOS, were unwilling to give up any control over 
their respective programs in South Vietnam.  Richard Hunt assesses “these disagreements 
reflected uncertainty within the administration as to the nature of the VC threat and the 
appropriate response.”105 
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Numerous reports and studies show leaders in Washington were aware of the VC 
threat and tried to make changes within the different U.S. bureaucracies to counter the 
VC.  Robert Komer, CORDS’ first director in Vietnam, explains that from the outset of 
the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, there was a call for an alternative approach to military 
power.106  However, for the first year in Vietnam, the U.S. Army stuck with their 
conventional tactics, using massive firepower and high-tech weaponry to fight both the 
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the VC.  With little to no progress being gained 
using these tactics, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara committed to capping 
deployments of ground forces and putting more emphasis on pacification efforts. 
Pacification is a term borrowed from the French, which unfortunately also 
includes colonialist overtones.  One of the various definitions of pacification is the 
process of making peace or reconciliation; to bring about a peaceful submission.  Most 
decision makers agreed with this broad and very general definition, but pinning down 
specific strategies for pacification varied widely. 
The reality in Vietnam was the Vietnamese people, not the enemy, needed to be 
the objective for the U.S.  The VC was intent on destroying the “social adhesive that had 
traditionally integrated the villager into his society and provided him with a sense of 
identity.”107  William Andrews goes on to state their “purpose was not only to eliminate 
those who could be harmful to the movement, but also make the people afraid and keep 
them from cooperating with the government.”108 
A chilling first-hand account of an example of how the VC controlled the local 
population was provided by Retired Colonel Robert B. Rigg, USA: 
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The hamlet was at peace.  The war had been there several times before, 
but it had moved away.  In the glow of a red hot sunset, children played.  
Parents felt reasonably secure, and all awaited the cooling comfort of 
nightfall.  Both men and women had worked hard in the marshy steaming 
rice fields.  Lanterns were being lit in the market place when five strangers 
appeared.  A sixth man, with fear written on the tortured lines of his pale 
face, was in the midst of the five.  The peasants grew quiet as they 
watched this pale man being tied to a tree by the strangers.  The execution 
was simple.  Every eye saw the pale man’s entrails spill out as he was 
disemboweled with a rusty bayonet.  A woman shrieked and clutched a 
small child.  Moments later both were seized by the grim-featured 
strangers.  No one moved except the strangers as they beheaded the child.  
The woman collapsed in sobbing hysteria.  Her quivering body was turned 
over and her black pajama-like costume was harshly stripped off revealing 
the nakedness of a pregnant figure.  Within minutes she lay still in death 
with four small angry red bullet holes across her abdomen.  Some of the 
peasants vomited, other turned their frightened eyes away.  The strangers 
spoke for the first time.  “Do not cooperate with the puppet government or 
the Americans.  If you do, we shall return and this will happen to you!”109 
Horrific acts such as this were not uncommon.  They made the villagers believe 
the South Vietnamese Government (GVN) had neither the ability nor the will to protect 
its own people.  The vast majority of the population in the rural villages was simple 
farmers or peasants who did not support the VC or their cause.  However, the villagers 
could not support the U.S. and the GVN pacification efforts due to lack of security. 
C. MILITARY BATTLE VERSUS POLITICAL STRUGGLE? 
As stated above, there were two parallel but separate wars being fought in 
Vietnam: one military, one political.  Pacification was seen as either civil or military, but 
not as a joint civil-military process.  Most military personnel agreed that there had to be 
security before any sort of development could occur.  Most civilian officials thought 
civilian development would foster support from the population, which in time would 
bring about military success.  This created a conflict for the U.S. in how they approached  
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the war.  According to Thomas Scoville, based on the amount of resources and emphasis 
devoted to the military in Vietnam by the U.S. government, a de facto policy was 
established in favor of a military solution.110 
The tide started shifting towards pacification efforts when at the Manila 
Conference in October 1966, South Vietnamese leaders committed up to 60 percent of 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) infantry battalions towards Revolutionary 
Development (RD) and the U.S. reorganized its pacification efforts into the Office of 
Civil Operations.111  This was President Johnson’s plan to finally get “the other war” into 
the mainstream of the overall war effort. 
D. THE OTHER WAR 
Robert Komer became President Johnson’s chief White House advisor on 
pacification and joined forces with other Americans who believed the U.S. was 
expending too many resources on the conventional war and not enough on 
counterinsurgency programs.  Komer decided the first item of business was to improve 
coordination among the organizations who were involved in the pacification efforts: the 
CIA, the DoD, the USAID, the DoS, the USIA, and the Joint U.S. Public Affairs 
Office.112  After years of failed attempts at coordinating the activities of these various 
agencies, it was time for something on a larger scale. 
On the advice of Komer and Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, President 
Johnson decided finally to unify the civilian and military pacification efforts.  President 
Johnson signed the National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 362 on 9 May 1967 
creating CORDS.  The NSAM charged General William Westmoreland 
(COMUSMACV) with American civil and military support of pacification and named 
Komer (DEPCORDS) as his deputy for pacification with the personal rank of 
ambassador.  As Gen Westmoreland’s deputy, Komer had the authority and power of a 
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three-star general.  NSAM 362 also clarified that Komer was to be a manger and 
supervisor …in other words, not just over there as a political advisor.  Secretary of 
Defense McNamara told Komer this language needed to be in NSAM 362 because “you 
can’t run a railroad unless you have the authority.”113  This was also the first time in 
history an ambassador served directly under a military commander and was in the chain 
of command.114  Moreover, Komer stated “the problem was one of field execution, not 
Washington organization …the real problems were not in Washington any longer but in 
Vietnam …we could not manage the “other” war from 11,000 miles away.”115  It was 
time to manage the pacification efforts at the front line. 
Placing pacification under the military made the most sense.  Komer surmised 
“the military are far better able to organize, manage and execute major field programs 
under chaotic wartime conditions than are civilian agencies, by and large.”116  The 
change was needed for three reasons. 
1. Normal governmental coordination was inadequate since all civil and 
military pacification tasks were intertwined 
2. The problem was too large and complex for civilian agencies to handle 
alone 
3. Pacification was failing due to lack of military security and the military 
would take security more seriously if it were directly responsible for 
pacification117 
CORDS proved to be the turning point in the U.S. pacification effort.  What made 
CORDS different from its predecessors was its “comprehensive nature and massive scale 
of effort undertaken.”118  The previously separate civilian and military pacification 
efforts were now combined into one program and resulted in what may have been the 
only truly integrated civilian-military command in U.S. history.   
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Now CORDS was fully incorporated into General Westmoreland’s Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).  Initially, Gen Westmoreland’s staff was not 
too keen on the idea of a civilian being in the command structure.  However, Gen 
Westmoreland gave CORDS and Komer his full support because he knew pacification 
was a key to success.119  The General also recommended the best Army officers for 
Komer’s staff. 
The U.S. civilian agencies were not so much opposed to combining their 
pacification efforts as to being placed under the military.  Institutionally, civilian agencies 
stay out of military operations and in return, the military viewed pacification matters as 
civilian business.  The civilians were also afraid that pacification was now becoming 
militarized.  In fact, the only reason unification happened this time was because the order 
came directly from the White House.  Ironically, Komer mused that moving CORDS 
under the military “resulted in greater U.S. civilian influence over pacification than had 
ever existed before.”120  In CORDS, civilian and military entities were truly partnered.  
Soldiers served directly under civilians and vice versa.  They even wrote each other’s 
performance reports.  The pairing of a military commander with a civilian deputy for 
pacification was replicated down to the district levels, ensuring full integration into the 
military structure.  Personnel serving as province senior advisors were approximately half 
military and half civilian.  Billets were filled from all military branches and from State, 
USAID, CIA, USIA, and the White House. Moreover, appointment to CORDS positions 
were merit-based and no preference was given to either military or civilian personnel.  At 
its start, CORDS had approximately 4,000 military and 800 civilians and eventually put 
teams in all 250 districts and 44 provinces in South Vietnam.121 
Since CORDS had no real predecessor, they wrote their operating procedures as 
they went along.  They were less constrained by prior practices and were able to take an 
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innovative, flexible and pragmatic approach to pacification.  Instead of writing more 
memos on what needed to be done, they sent memos out asking how to do things.  Komer 
explained CORDS was different because it was “action-oriented and management 
minded.”122  Their goal was to make these pacification programs work, not just talk more 
about them. 
CORDS stressed the need to build viable and responsible political institutions at 
the local and national level.  It called for land reform, rural development, and 
anticorruption measures.  It also placed more emphasis on “clear and hold” by police and 
paramilitary forces to provide sustained protection to the rural population versus the 
military’s “search and destroy” operations which were targeted on larger enemy units.  It 
also stressed good political intelligence.123 
Upon taking over CORDS, Komer proceeded to “consolidate management of 
programs and resources, enhance the influence of American advisors on South 
Vietnamese officials, invigorate efforts to combat the VC infrastructure, and improve the 
Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF).”124  Gen Westmoreland knew CORDS 
would not succeed without security elements, so he agreed to give CORDS advisory 
responsibility for the RF/PF forces since they were responsible for village level security.  
Komer re-ordered pacification priorities and clarified direction through a crash program 
he dubbed Project TAKEOFF.  TAKEOFF’s eight action programs were: 
• Improve 1968 pacification planning 
• Accelerate Chieu Hoi125 
• Mount attack on VC infrastructure (VCI) 
• Expand and improve RVNAF support to pacification 
• Expand and supplement RD team effort 
• Increase capability to handle refugees 
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• Revamp police forces 
• Press land reform126 
1. Improve 1968 Pacification Planning 
It seems obvious the main improvement after unification would be coordination.  
The first order of business for Komer was to establish a joint planning group comprised 
of representatives from CORDS, USAID, and the Joint United States Public Affairs 
Office (JUSPAO).  This group reviewed all pacification plans and developed guidelines.  
CORDS’s position within the MACV staff also made it easier to integrate with military 
planners since they were right down the hall.127  In an effort to streamline processes and 
ensure efficient use of resources, Komer changed pacification priority areas to match 
where the military was focusing their efforts and also administratively realigned 
pacification programs within provincial and district boundaries.128  Critical here was 
Komer’s insistence that the military and the civilians were in sync administratively as to 
how they viewed the battle space. 
2. Accelerate Chieu Hoi 
President Diem originally created this program back in 1963 at the suggestion of 
the CIA.  The concept of the program was a “rallier” (the term used for people who 
defected) was offered amnesty if they left the Communists.  They would be questioned 
by the Chieu Hoi on VC tactics, areas of VC operations, location of VC cadre, other 
information deemed of intelligence value, etc.  Then the goal was for these folks to be 
integrated back into GVN life.  In Komer’s opinion, this was the most cost-effective 
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program and the capacity of the reception centers doubled in 1967.  During 1967, over 
27,000 defected from the VC or North Vietnamese forces.129  The biggest payoff came in 
1969 when 47,000 came in, raising the total to 140,000 since 1963.130 
Unfortunately, Chieu Hoi failed to reach its greatest potential because CORDS 
could not convince the GVN an insurgent could be turned into a valuable asset. Of the 
27,000 who defected in 1967, only about 5,400 received vocational training, most 
receiving it from American contractors or the U.S. Navy Seabees.  The ARVN also 
refused to use former VCs.  Instead of rehabilitating them, the defectors were often 
beaten and jailed.131 
3. Mount Attack on VC Infrastructure (VCI) 
A systematic campaign was needed that targeted the VC’s clandestine political 
and administrative infrastructure.  These were the hard-core cadre that gave direction, 
handled recruitment, taxed the locals, and basically ran the guerilla war.  Unfortunately, 
U.S. military leadership did not view the VCI as important as NVA military units, so it 
was up to the CIA and a few various civilian and GVN agencies to deal with.132  The 
Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Program was an attempt to target the VCI.  The concept was to 
identify, locate and arrest the VC cadre using standardized police-type procedures.  Then 
they would be tried according to GVN law and imprisoned if found guilty.133 
CORDS now had responsibility for this faltering program.  Since Komer had 
served in the CIA for thirteen years, he knew what the organization was capable of and it 
was his obvious choice to head this effort.134  The CIA was to act as an umbrella 
organization, providing common direction, doctrine, measurement and a reporting 
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system.135  The GVN was to run the program with the U.S. in an advisory role.  A key 
objective of the Phoenix program was to get away from the dragnet type operations 
where a unit would roll into a village, detain every adult male villager and question them.  
Komer wanted a “rifle shot approach” versus the more commonly used “shotgun” 
operation …target an individual, do a background check, then go pick that one person 
up.136   
Komer continued to believe the CIA was the right organization to develop the 
Phoenix program.  He admitted it was not without its controversy: 
Few pacification sub-programs have been more controversial than the 
U.S.-supported GVN effort to do something at long last about neutralizing 
the clandestine VC political and administrative structure that was one of 
the secrets of the VC success …  If Vietnam was a “people’s war” as 
Hanoi called it, a political and revolutionary as much as a military conflict, 
then rooting out this network of perhaps 100,000 to 150,000 hard core 
cadre at its peak was one of the most critical tasks we faced.  Without it, 
no matter what our purely military achievements, their lasting impact 
would be in doubt.  It is a sad commentary on the overly conventional 
nature of the U.S./GVN approach to insurgency war that not until mid-
1967 did we even begin to mount a major concerted attack on the VC 
clandestine political structure—its shadow government at all levels down 
to hamlet.  Our failure was not because we didn’t recognize the problem—
you can find studies going all the way back to the mid-fifties that correctly 
identified the key VCI role.  It was largely because nobody tackled it as an 
operational and management problem—it was everybody’s business and 
nobody’s.  It fell between the cracks.  The reason I began zeroing in on it 
in late 1966 was because I saw that winning over the farmers would 
require not just providing territorial security against the enemy main and 
local forces but also rooting out the clandestine political and terror 
apparatus.  So I made it an integral part of pacification.137 
Komer’s frustration was how the GVN implemented the overall program.  It was 
more than just identifying the enemy …the concept included both identification and 
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capture or another form of neutralization such as sentencing.  The emphasis CORDS 
wanted was to capture and interrogate versus kill.  Once the CIA brought the South 
Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) in to support Phoenix, they had a 
tendency to kill the enemy instead of capture them.138  Because the CIA controlled the 
PRUs and money was their principle motivator, PRUs were considered “mercenaries” by 
the American public.139  Komer is adamant the Phoenix program did not violate the 
Geneva Convention nor was it a program of systematic political assassination.140  
Unfortunately, negative publicity surrounds the CIA, the Phoenix program (and CORDS, 
albeit erroneously) to this day.141 
4. Expand and Improve RVNAF Support to Pacification 
A key feature of the CORDS program was its emphasis on sustained security 
(local clear and hold) as the indispensible first stage of pacification.  The pacification 
planners viewed the under-utilized, paramilitary Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF 
and PF or “Ruff-Puffs,” as they were often called) as the logical force on which to 
build.142  They were all locally recruited and most were volunteers.  In reality, they were 
lower-quality Vietnamese assets that no one else wanted.143  However, the concept 
worked!  They were lightly armed, meaning they were cheap to support, and already 
organized in small territorial units.  RF served only in their own provinces and PF in their 
own districts.  Primary responsibility for security of the local and rural populations 
devolved upon local forces recruited from the population itself.144 
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Once CORDS upgraded the RF/PF’s equipment, improved pay and benefits, and 
placed their command under province and district chiefs, the RF/PF members’ social 
status among the villages was elevated and their numbers started to increase greatly.  
MACV fielded 353 Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT), consisting of two U.S. officer and 
three NCOs to give on-the-job training to these RF/PF units.  They expanded by more 
than 100,000 in 1968 alone and by 1973 numbered some 540,000 men in over 1600 RF 
companies and 7000 PF platoons.145  Moreover, the Vietnamese men would rather serve 
in their local RF/PF forces because it meant they could stay close to home. 
In a response to anti-VC feelings after the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the urging of 
Komer, President Thieu revived the People’s Self-Defense Force (PSDF).  The GVN 
required all able-bodied males, ages sixteen and seventeen and ages thirty-nine through 
fifty,146 join the PSDF.  Each member had to stand guard and serve as a lookout one 
night per week.  The PSDF eventually grew to over 4 million and although the PSDF’s 
usefulness in engaging the enemy was negligible at best, their most useful role was a 
means of engaging the local population politically.147 
5. Expand and Supplement RD Team Effort 
The Revolutionary Development (RD) concept was the GVN’s attempt to 
consolidate their current pacification efforts prior to CORDS.  The RD cadre were 
recruited from where they would serve and attend training to become agents of social 
change at the National Training Center at Vung Tau.  Teams of 59 men and women 
between the ages of 21 and 29 would work with a hamlet to: restore local elected 
government, assist in community self-help or government-subsidized development 
projects (such as repairing roads, buildings and bridges), provide medical treatment to the  
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ill and aid farmers.148  Teams also issued identification cards to civilians, recruited 
people for military service, organized self-defense groups, and conducted political 
rallies.149 
Again, this program never reached its full potential in part because the GVN 
failed to provide proper incentives to attract and retain their best and brightest to this 
program.  For instance, the GVN did not exempt cadre members from military service 
and they also refused to allow time spent on RD teams count towards their obligatory 
military duty.  Moreover, these teams were not operating in the safest environments and 
were regular targets of the VC. 
CORDS was able to make some headway with the program and increased the RD 
teams from 361 to 555 in 1967, but they could never get over the retention problem.150  
They would lose RD cadre as fast as they could get them through training to the ARVN.  
Komer had an idea to meld the PF and RD cadre into one GVN civil-military team, but it 
never materialized due to lack of GVN support. 
6. Increase Capability to Handle Refugees 
CORDS took the refugee program over from USAID and tried its best to bring 
this issue to light.  The Vietnamese had done little in this area and according to Komer, 
had no concept of a Refugee Ministry or welfare assistance.  CORDS set up refugee 
programs using Army Civil Affairs teams and U.S. non-governmental organizations and 
religious charities.  Once CORDS took over the refugee program, there were 1.5 million 
refugees with 1,000 people working in the Refugee Ministry with 60 U.S. advisors.  They 
could re-settle approximately 1,000 people a month.151 
There was also scuttlebutt that Komer had supported a controversial earlier U.S. 
policy that the military was intentionally creating refugees in order to deny the enemy 
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access to manpower in the countryside.152  Andrew Krepinevich finds “between 1964 and 
1969 over 3 million South Vietnamese, 20 percent of the population, were refugees at one 
time or another as a result of the attrition strategy and the policy of population 
relocation.”153  Komer urged General Westmoreland to stop creating refugees because 
CORDS could not handle anymore.  Komer also demanded the military take 
responsibility and temporarily care for the displaced persons caused by their military 
operations.154  However, the damage had already been done …the majority of the 
refugees blamed the U.S. and GVN for their predicament.155 
7. Revamp Police Forces 
In the initial stages of an insurgency, Komer viewed the role of the local police as 
decisive.  If the insurgency is too large-scale, then it is beyond the capabilities of a police 
force alone and the military has to step in.  However, at all stages of an insurgency, the 
police play a key role in “coping with any clandestine political structure like the VCI.”156  
Komer stated since 1955 the U.S. supported the Vietnamese National Police, but in his 
opinion, the U.S. did not do as much as they should have.  Moreover, he suggests it 
would have been much cheaper than supporting the ARVN. 
When CORDS tried to expand the police force, they ran into difficulties.  South 
Vietnamese males between the age of eighteen and twenty-eight had an obligation to 
serve in the military and the police were not allowed to recruit from this pool of 
applicants.  The police could recruit military veterans, but those individuals were subject 
to being recalled back to military service.  Unfortunately, the police forces did not attract  
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the highest caliber of recruits and those they did attract were often economically 
challenged.  This created a situation that made the police force vulnerable to corruption 
and bribes.157 
8. Press Land Reform 
When Komer was back in an advisory role in the White House in 1966-1967, he 
pushed complex land reform measures.  It was not until he was in Vietnam that he backed 
off from this.  Komer realized land reform during wartime was difficult and any changes 
had to be simple to execute.  Komer also got into a turf battle with USAID over who 
should manage the land reform.  Moreover, GVN was in favor of more impractical land 
reform schemes.  CORDS proposed simpler measures such as freezing land rents and 
putting a moratorium on ownership disputes.158 
Land reform remained a dormant issue with CORDS until 1969.  In 1970, over 
900,000 acres of land were distributed free to some 300,000 families and by 1973, well 
over half the rural population benefited from land reform.159 
E. OTHER AREAS OF EMPHASIS 
CORDS not only enhanced local protection and area security, it also focused its 
efforts on nation- and state-building.  The concepts of Jeffersonian democracy had to win 
over the Communist version of People’s democracy or the entire military battle was for 
naught.  The civil programs CORDS managed were aimed at: 1) reviving a functioning 
rural administration, 2) rural economic revival with incentives for farmers, and 3) other 
essential rural services such as medical, education, refugee care and a civil police 
presence.160  Many of these programs were already attempted piecemeal under USAID, 
but they were consolidated under CORDS. 
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CORDS really set the stage for a concerted GVN/U.S. effort towards restoring 
village and hamlet self-government.  From 1967-1970, the villagers elected hamlet chiefs 
and village councils, created village budgets, and reformed their local taxes.  The local 
security forces and police were moved under the village chief’s authority in 1969.  The 
village councils managed their own GVN self-help funds and decided how to prioritize 
projects in their villages.  There was always a conscious effort on the part of CORDS not 
to Americanize the projects.  The goal was to push ownership of projects down to the 
village level.  Ultimately, CORDS helped to create a grassroots movement that focused 
on security and community development.161 
As for economic revival in the rural areas, CORDS assisted the GVN with efforts 
to close the urban-rural gap.  The focus was on agricultural improvements since the vast 
majority of the rural population were farmers.  When it comes down to it, most farmers 
were not that interested in the Saigon government.  So, CORDS implemented projects 
that impacted farmers where it really mattered—their pocketbooks!  Crop producers were 
given more money for their products, new rice strains were introduced, fertilizer was 
distributed, and key roads and waterways were re-opened and upgraded to improve trade 
and market routes.  Rural taxes were temporarily abolished and water pumps and tractors 
were introduced in large numbers.162   
1. Importance of People 
Even in an ideal operating environment where one is not hindered by bureaucratic 
policies and regulations, without the right people in the right positions, the job will not 
get done.  The leader is ultimately the one who sets the tempo for getting things done.  
From President Johnson to General Westmoreland, all agree that Komer was the right 
man for the job.  With the nickname of “Blowtorch,” he pushed himself and his people 
hard.  According to General Westmoreland, “Komer blustered, sometimes blundered,  
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knocked heads together, wrote one caustic memorandum after another to any and all on 
whatever subject, including strategy.  He had imaginative ideas, usually sound.  At the 
start [of CORDS] abrasion was in order.  Komer was the man for the job.”163 
When General Creighton Abrams replaced Gen Westmoreland as MACV 
commander in June 1968, Abrams had a very different opinion of Komer.  Abrams was 
suspicious of Komer and thought he was a lackey for the boys back in Washington.164  
Abrams did not appreciate Komer’s gruff ways and thought it made a negative impact on 
the Vietnamese.  Ambassador William Colby took over as DEPCORDS in November 
1968 when Komer became U.S. ambassador to Turkey.  Colby’s personality gelled with 
Abrams’ and CORDS continued to make progress until it was eventually disbanded at the 
end of 1972. 
As for his staff, Komer carefully selected six or seven of the best personnel he 
could find to surround himself with (ex. Richard Holbrooke, Colonel Robert M. 
Montague, Jr, and Richard Moorsteen.)  Since the entire mission of pacification was 
focused on people, it was all the more important to have the right people who understood 
the CORDS vision in key positions.  Komer reflected he and his staff of six or seven did 
more than he ever could have with a 100-man staff.165  
2. Measuring Performance 
CORDS attempted to find an evaluation system for their programs that moved 
away from the American tendency to over-inflate statistics.  Moreover, “VCI 
neutralization” had become a critical measuring stick for field unit performance.166  One 
thing was for sure, casualty ratios were not going to work for CORDS.  Komer admitted 
when CORDS was first established, figuring out how to measure its success was going to 
be tricky.  CORDS borrowed the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) from the CIA and the 
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U.S. Marines and tweaked it for their use.  Basically, it was a matrix with five different 
grading categories the district advisors filled out in an attempt to gather standard 
quantitative data on pacification efforts in every South Vietnamese village.  In order to 
get accurate, truthful data, Komer made it clear to the U.S. district advisors that HES was 
an evaluation system on the GVN, not on themselves.  In other words, their performance 
reports were not directly correlated to how their villages were graded.  The HES received 
a lot of negative press and Komer agreed the HES had its weaknesses, but given the 
situation on the ground and the resources, they had to work with, it sufficed.167  A 
postwar study of the HES confirmed it was the most effective system to use at the time 
for the data CORDS was capturing.168 
F. CORDS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
Is it too presumptuous to suggest that since the North Vietnamese relied on 
conventional means to overthrow South Vietnam, CORDS and the pacification programs 
were successful?  William Colby stated, “The attack of 1972 and the final attack of 1975 
were pure North Vietnamese military attacks.  There were no guerrillas in those 
operations because in the interim our program actually won the guerilla war by winning 
the guerilla to the government.  They were all on the government side.”169  There are 
records that show members of the VC also shared Colby’s viewpoint.  A VC official 
surrendered to the RF/PF in 1971 and reported, “recruiting became nearly impossible in 
his region after the pacification program reached full operating capacity in 1969.”170  The 
pacification strategy arguably defeated the VC, but unfortunately, it did not have the 
same impact on the North Vietnamese forces.  
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Pacification critics claim the U.S. made the Vietnamese people lazy and too 
reliant upon U.S. presence.171  Henry Kissinger stated in 1969, “Unfortunately, our 
military strength has no political corollary; we have been unable so far to create a 
political structure that could survive military opposition from Hanoi after we 
withdraw.”172  During a November 1969 seminar, Komer was asked if the reason the 
U.S. was not making more progress in the pacification area was because of the 
Vietnamese people.  His response: 
Let me return now to the thesis that we couldn’t do anything because of 
the Vietnamese!  Pacification was 99 percent Vietnamese program!  Every 
operating element of pacification was run by the GVN with GVN 
personnel.  We had roughly speaking a 100 to 1 ratio of Vietnamese to 
advisors.  Nor were we in the command channel.  We did things behind 
the scenes, but mostly by informally and very discreetly cluing the 
Vietnamese top management.  I couldn’t issue any orders to the 
Vietnamese, nor could Westmoreland.  Thus in pacification we did get a 
truly Vietnamese program going on a really major scale!  And remember, 
we had the lowest grade Vietnamese assets.  When we say that we did 
make a Vietnamese program work from behind the scenes, it looks all the 
more impressive when you realize what we had to work with were the 
ragtag and bobtail of the Vietnamese assets.  We got the local militia, not 
the ARVN.  We got the crummy “White Mice,” the Police, not the fancy 
military intelligence guys.  We got what was left; we got the local 
officials, not the hot-shots who were big wheels in Saigon.  In other 
words, we built pacification with the assets that were really not being 
utilized.  This never appears in the documents! 
Interviewer: What you’re saying is that it is a fallacy to say that the 
Vietnamese cannot do it. 
Komer: Yes!  While we put pacification on the map, we did it by selling it 
to the Vietnamese, getting the right Vietnamese put in the right places, 
dealing with those Vietnamese (including Thieu) who were sold on 
pacification.  It was their program, even though we exerted an immense 
behind-the-scenes influence on concepts, structure, planning, etc.  If we 
could do that with pacification, it could be done with ARVN.  Maybe it is 
being done with ARVN at long last.  We actually got Vietnamese officials 
fired by mounting a campaign with the top people.  In this case it had to be 
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President Thieu, because at least initially nobody was willing to act 
without the President.  We got a whole slew of them fired—more than half 
the province chiefs, and, as of the time I left, a third of the district 
chiefs.173 
Komer is also the first to admit that CORDS was not an efficient, high-impact 
program.  In fact, Komer points out like most things in Vietnam, it was cumbersome, 
wasteful, poorly executed, and only spottily effective in many respects.174  Another 
criticism of CORDS is it over-simplified the issue and made quantity substitute for 
quality.  It is a truism that CORDS provided sustained security and other support in the 
rural areas for over 10,000 hamlets in 250 districts of 44 provinces by applying one of the 
principles of war: mass.  The only way to sustain rural security on this vast scale was 
manpower, and lots of it!  Komer saw the mass approach as “the only feasible way to get 
early countrywide impact, given the extent of the need, the limited quality of the 
resources available, the GVNs limited administrative capabilities and the lateness of the 
day.”175  CORDS utilized all available resources by working multiple programs 
simultaneously, but according to a realistic set of priorities.  Komer points out the 
concept seemed overly simplistic, but it was “essential to avoid a major weakness of the 
previous efforts, when securing forces stayed only briefly and then moved on, after which 
hamlets often retrogressed.”176 
CORDS has also been criticized for having too many U.S. advisors.  During 1967, 
approximately 4,000 military and 800 civilians served in CORDS.  At its peak in 1969, 
CORDS had 6,400 military and 1,000 civilians.  The following is Komer’s response 
when asked if he over-Americanized pacification: 
This argument falls of its own weight when one looks at the facts.  By the 
time I left Vietnam, CORDS had grown to about 5500 advisors, but it was 
assisting and supporting roughly 550,000 Vietnamese—a 100 to 1 ratio.  
By 1970, CORDS had reached about 7200, but Vietnamese inputs had 
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also grown accordingly.  A 100 to 1 ration hardly seems excessive when 
one consider the number of sub-programs the U.S. is supporting, and the 
fact that countrywide pacification means operating in 4 regions, 44 
provinces, 250-odd districts, and over 2000 villages in South Vietnam.  
Moreover, over half the U.S. advisors were either junior officers and 
NCOs working with RF/PF or administrative/logistics people taking care 
of internal U.S. house-keeping in the field.  All in all, CORDS appears as 
a quite lean operation both in comparison with the U.S. military 
establishment in Vietnam and in terms of the results it achieved.  By any 
standard of cost-effectiveness, the American advisory investment looks 
rather good indeed.177 
There is also an argument that the U.S. did not send enough conventional troops 
to win the military battle.  Robert Morris explains, “although sending 2.5 million troops 
over ten years seems high, eighty percent of U.S. troop strength were in support roles.  At 
U.S. peak strength with 500,000, only about 100,000 were “trigger pullers” out in the 
jungles.  According to lessons learned from the British in Malaya, conventional forces 
need at least a ten to one superiority to keep insurgents under control.”178 
Other criticism of the CORDS program is generally focused on its limited 
duration and scope.  Komer and Colby have repeatedly stated the pacification efforts in 
Vietnam were too little, too late.179  According to Komer, even after 1967, “pacification 
remained a small tail to the very large conventional military dog.  It was never tried on a 
large enough scale until too late.”180   
The main take away is CORDS was a major GVN/U.S. program specifically 
created to address the atypical problems in Vietnam.  The interrelationship of U.S. 
civilian, military and GVN counterpart functions allowed for a more efficient use of 
resources.  It was far more cost-effective than other parts of the war effort.  It entailed 
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only a “modest fraction of the enormous cost of the Vietnam War and was tailored 
directly to the needs of the environment.”181  Whatever its faults, the CORDS program 
stands out as one of the few efforts undertaken by the GVN and the U.S. that addressed 
the key problems of dealing with rural-based insurgency.182 
G. LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN 
Although there are probably a number of lessons that could be pulled from the 
study of the pacification effort in Vietnam, this thesis will focus on how the following 
four macro-level lessons along with several corresponding sub-lessons can be applied to 
the current efforts in Afghanistan: 
1. Unity of Effort 
This is what put CORDS on the map.  Pacification efforts in Vietnam attempted 
pre-CORDS were never able to make a significant impact on the battlefield because they 
were not attempted on a large enough scale and they did not have the support of the 
military.  It was not until all facets of the pacification effort were combined under a 
single-manager (Komer) and moved under MACV did that start to change.  Having a 
coordinated civilian-military effort ensured the efficient and effective use of resources.  
CORDS further capitalized on this by using a de-centralized approach and giving 
advisors at the district and village level the flexibility to make decisions on programs that 
were specific to their area of responsibility. 
2. Right People in the Right Positions 
Komer knew the only way for pacification to work in Vietnam was to have the 
best people with the right attitude and focus.  He and his small, hand-selected staff 
worked to get the best civilians in the various advisory positions.  All civilian advisors 
went through 13-weeks of intensive training and those who showed an aptitude for the 
Vietnamese language stayed longer.  Once CORDS personnel were in-country, they 
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attended another class which was usually hosted by Komer himself.  He constantly 
communicated the pacification message and had no qualms about replacing those who 
did not meet his standards.  Those he liked, he created incentives for them to stay in their 
positions longer.  It is critical people working at all levels understand the culture, history, 
language, and impact of their decisions. 
3. Ownership has to Start at the Local Level 
CORDS helped the GVN build viable and responsible political institutions at the 
local level.  Komer made it clear these were GVN programs with the U.S. in a supporting 
role.  CORDS also prioritized programs that were important to the large population of 
peasant farmers: land reform, rural development, and anticorruption measures.  But above 
all else, Komer stressed CORDS was successful because the Vietnamese people were in 
the lead from the top down to the lowest level possible--the village.  If the local people do 
not support or believe in the programs that are being implemented by the government, 
they will not be sustained in the long run. 
4. Sustainable Security 
CORDS emphasized sustained security at the local level as the indispensible first 
stage of pacification.  CORDS utilized the local police and paramilitary forces to provide 
sustained protection to the rural population versus the military’s “search and destroy” 
operations, which were targeted on larger enemy units.  CORDS viewed the under-
utilized, paramilitary RF and PF as the logical force on which to build.  They were all 
locally recruited and most were volunteers.  They were lightly armed, meaning they were 
cheap to support, and already organized in small territorial units.  RF served only in their 
own provinces and PF in their own districts.  Primary responsibility for security of the 
local and rural populations devolved upon local forces recruited from the population 
itself.  CORDS put the onus for securing the local environment back on the local 
population.  Ultimately, the implementation and sustainability of all programs depends on 
security of the population. 
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H. SUMMARY 
In his memoirs, William Colby said CORDS worked, but “the experience has 
hardly been noticed in accounts of the Vietnam War.  A new situation could thus well 
require the same laborious and costly process of experimentation that preceded CORDS.  
It was a better way then, but it came too late for the American people, whatever its 
successes on the ground.  We cannot afford to stumble again before some new 
challenge.”183 
However, Samuel P. Huntington warns that “every historical event or confluence 
of events is unique” and we should not draw “mislessons” from Vietnam since the exact 
set of circumstances will never be duplicated elsewhere.184  Robert Pfaltzgraff echoes 
Huntington’s thought with his own warning on applying lessons from Vietnam to future 
conflicts: 
The military lessons of the Vietnam War, while numerous, are by no 
means either self-evident or instructive about wars of the future.  If the 
United States succeeded or failed in Vietnam because of its inability to 
adapt quickly to the circumstances of Vietnam or its penchant for 
conducting the war in Vietnam with capabilities and doctrines developed 
and tested in conflicts elsewhere, similar problems may arise in the wars 
of the future.  Therefore, a learning of the military lessons of Vietnam, 
without regard for the unique characteristics of the Vietnam War and 
future wars, will serve American policy in those potential conflicts no 
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The point of this thesis is not to imply CORDS is a cookie-cutter approach for 
stabilizing Afghanistan or for that matter, any other future conflict.  However, the fact 
that the U.S. invested enormous amounts of resources and manpower into Vietnam, yet 
ultimately had little overall impact, should not be a footnote in history.  This was not lost 
on Harry Summers either: 
From the American professional soldier’s perspective, the most frustrating 
aspect of the Vietnam conflict is that the U.S. armed forces did everything 
they were supposed to do, winning every major battle of the war, yet 
North Vietnam, rather than the United States, triumphed in the end.  How 
could U.S. troops have succeeded so well, but the war effort have failed so 
miserably?186 
Summers last statement seems implausible.  How could U.S. troops who have the 
high-tech weaponry, massive artillery and are the best trained forces in the world, win 
battles, but still lose the war?  The same has been said about our current efforts in 
Afghanistan.  This would suggest either 1) we are not applying conventional tactics in the 
right way or 2) something other than conventional tactics are needed to win.  The next 
chapter will make the case for number two, that something other than conventional tactics 
are needed to win.  Hopefully, there is still time to change the course of history so 
veterans who served in Afghanistan are not asking the same type of questions as they did 
after Vietnam. 
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IV. APPLICATION TO AFGHANISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Defining what success means in Afghanistan is complicated.  Even more elusive 
is determining how we get there.  The international community is eight years into the 
conflict and arguably still does not agree on what the end state for Afghanistan should 
look like, much less the path we take to get there.  NATO finally issued a “strategic 
vision” for Afghanistan in April 2008 at its 20th Summit in Bucharest, Romania.  Its 
objectives: “extremism and terrorism will no longer pose a threat to stability, Afghan 
National Security Forces will be in the lead and self-sufficient, and the Afghan National 
Government will be able to extend the reach of good governance, reconstruction, and 
development throughout the country to the benefit of all its citizens.”187  On the surface, 
this end state for Afghanistan sounds realistic.  However, how does it translate into 
strategy. 
The only way to work towards this strategic vision for Afghanistan is by focusing 
on the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction: governance and participation, social 
and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and security.  These four pillars are 
inter-related and in order to achieve real and lasting results, have to be integrated, 
coordinated and synchronized.  As captured in the 2005 Afghanistan Millennium 
Development Goals Report, “Development without security is unachievable, and security 
without development is meaningless.”188 
If figuring out a plan for each of these four pillars was not enough to contend 
with, adding to Afghanistan’s complexity are the range of actors providing support to the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), including NATO, the 
United Nations (UN), various other international and local non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), as well as individual states.  Each actor has their own, and 
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sometimes even competing, set of interests and priorities.  Furthermore, since the security 
situation in Afghanistan is so poor, the military has to be an integral part of the broader 
strategy because establishing and maintaining a secure environment is the lynchpin for 
the other three pillars. 
This chapter will provide a current status of the NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and a 
brief history of how they got to where they are today.  The chapter will then explore 
various initiatives sponsored by the international community in Afghanistan and how 
these programs can actually be a unifying strategy for ISAF PRT efforts.  Finally, the 
chapter will discuss how the four macro-lessons and various sub-lessons from CORDS 
could be applied to the current situation in Afghanistan. 
B. CURRENT STATUS OF ISAF 
ISAF is actively working to create the conditions of security and stability that will 
allow the GIRoA to carry out its reconstruction and development plans with the ultimate 
goal of transforming itself into a stable democracy.  Currently, there are 26 PRTs in 
Afghanistan (12 U.S.-led) with different lead nations responsible for the five separate 
Regional Commands.189  (This fact alone undoubtedly creates complexities that Komer 
did not have to contend with in Vietnam.)  ISAF is a multi-national alliance comprised of 
countries that have different resources, capabilities and various goals to accomplish in 
Afghanistan.  In fact, one of the chief criticisms of the PRT program is that seven years 
after its implementation, it still operates with no structured template.  Each lead nation 
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basically runs its own program according to its national interests and political will, which 
is not necessarily always in the best interest of the Afghan people.190 
In October 2008, an effort was made to close the strategy gap by the former 
COMISAF, U.S. Army General David McKiernan.  The primary goal of this new Joint 
Campaign Plan (JCP) was to transfer lead security responsibilities to the Afghans.  
Afghans would now be responsible for both planning and conducting operations.  
Another big shift was the JCP used language that referred to the ISAF mission in COIN 
terms (ex., “insurgents” and “shape, clear, hold, build”) versus NATO’s previous 
preference for only focusing on stability operations.191  ISAF’s new mission statement 
became: “ISAF conducts operations in partnership with GIRoA and in coordination with 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), and the international community in order to assist GIRoA to defeat the 
insurgency, establish a secure environment, extend viable governance, and promote 
development throughout Afghanistan.”192 
The JCP was not the first attempt to incorporate Afghans into the planning and 
operational process.  An earlier effort to integrate PRT activities with Afghanistan’s 
broader political, military and economic goals was the creation of the PRT Executive 
Steering Committee (ESC) in December 2004.  In January 2009, the General Director of 
the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) replaced the Afghan Minister 
of Interior as chair of the ESC in an effort to come in line with the Afghan National 
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Development Strategy (ANDS).193  The verdict is still out on the ESC’s effectiveness 
since it has lacked any real authority to direct or coordinate PRT operations.194  
Hopefully, this trend will start to change under the current COMISAF, U.S. Army 
General Stanley McChrystal.  The ESC has recently developed a standardized monthly 
report that all 26 PRTs will provide to the GIRoA. 
C. EVOLUTION OF PRTS 
Since late 2002, PRTs have combined civilian and military personnel into a single 
entity with the purpose of improving security, governance, and economic development.  
They help bridge the gap between the execution of combat operations by coalition 
military forces and civilian-led reconstruction and development initiatives.  PRTs are an 
integral part of peacekeeping and stability operations, but they have also been criticized 
for their “mixed effectiveness, over-emphasis on military objectives and priorities, failure 
to effectively coordinate and communicate with UN and NGO organizations, and 
differences in staffing and mission.”195 
The early days of the PRTs are reminiscent of early pacification attempts by the 
U.S. and GVN in Vietnam: neither were given enough resources or made a serious 
enough priority to make any sort of widespread or sustainable impact on the battlefield.  
However, the lack of oversight allowed the PRTs to be flexible and not bound by 
bureaucratic rules and inertia, which enabled them to tailor their efforts to the needs of 
their specific AOR.  PRTs had a strategic mandate to “monitor, assist and facilitate,”196 
but how they implemented it was left up to the PRT commander on the ground.  Komer 
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experienced the same situation with CORDS.  Being a new organization gave CORDS 
the leeway to sometimes make things up as they went along.  Unfortunately, PRTs were 
unable to capitalize on their ability to operate outside of bureaucratic channels like 
CORDS did in 1967.  The ambiguity PRTs went through left them fighting to prove their 
importance in the broader political-military mission and scrounging for resources and 
support.  Brigade commanders were more concerned about taking the fight to the Taliban 
and since they controlled the resources, they had other priorities that came before some 
fuzzy civil affairs program.197 
The reality is PRTs were not a priority in the early stages of Afghanistan because 
nation-building activities were not a priority for the Bush Administration.  In fact, 
President Bush actively campaigned against nation-building and he was adamant the U.S. 
military “should be used to fight and win war.”198  This antipathy in the Bush 
Administration towards the military being used in nation-building activities created a 
flawed U.S. strategy before soldiers even stepped foot in Afghanistan.  Larry Goodson 
points out there were very few Afghan specialists within the USG due to America’s 
disengagement from the region after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.  Therefore, there 
were few experts to consult with during operational planning.  Even if nation-building 
activities would have been incorporated into the initial plans, the USG civilian agencies 
did not have the capacity to meet the requirements.  Ultimately, the U.S. entered 
Afghanistan with a faulty strategy from the start.  By not understanding Afghan history, 
its culture and its people caused the U.S. to make mistakes in the early part of the 
engagement that we are still recovering from today.199  An example of this lack of 
cultural understanding specific to PRTs is they actually started off being called Joint 
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Regional Teams.  President Karzai had to point out, “warlords rule regions; governors 
rule provinces,”200 so the name was changed to something that emphasized its 
reconstruction priority.  Another glaring fact that suggests nation-building activities play 
second fiddle to conventional efforts is only 26 PRTs have been established since late 
2002.201 
PRTs operating in Afghanistan have evolved somewhat in response to their 
different operating environments, but mainly due to the emphasis placed on them by their 
owning nation.  Three distinctive models stand out: 
U.S. model—averages 80 personnel with three to five civilians; led by military 
commander (there is one civilian director in Panjshir Valley); emphasis on quick impact 
projects; usually operates in volatile areas. 
UK model—averages 100 personnel with 30 civilians; led by civilian; emphasis 
on local capacity building; ability to operate in volatile area. 
German model—averages 400 personnel with 20 civilians; dual-headed 
leadership of one military and one civilian; emphasis on long-term sustainable 
development; operates in permissive environment.202 
Each model has its advantages and disadvantages and determining which model is 
best is outside the scope of this thesis.  The point being made is there are various 
approaches to PRTs in Afghanistan and the differences are unfortunately not necessarily 
driven by the operating environment, but rather by restrictions and caveats put in place by 
the owning nations.203 
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D. CAPACITY-BUILDING INITIATIVES BY THE AFGHAN 
GOVERNMENT 
The ultimate success of COIN depends on building and securing the legitimacy of 
the indigenous government at the local level.204  Programs are needed that build Afghan 
capacity, not make them dependent upon U.S. and ISAF military personnel, NGOs, or 
any other form of foreign aid.  Komer was adamant CORDS was a Vietnam program, ran 
by the Vietnamese people with the Americans playing a supporting role.  The same has to 
happen in Afghanistan with the international community playing a strong, but supporting 
role.  The initial groundwork for international support was laid in 2006 with the 
Afghanistan Compact.  It was further solidified during the June 2008 International 
Conference on Afghanistan held in Paris.  More than 80 donors pledged $20 billion USD, 
aligning themselves with financing and implementing the priorities set out by the 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).205 
1. Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
Verily, never will Allah change the condition of people unless they change it 
themselves. This verse from the Koran is in the opening pages of the ANDS document.  
President Karzai touts the ANDS as “an Afghan-owned blueprint for the development of 
Afghanistan in all spheres of human endeavor” and will help achieve the Afghanistan 
Compact benchmarks and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).206  According to the 
ANDS report: 
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It is the product of extensive consultations at the national, provincial and 
local levels.  A comprehensive “bottom-up” approach that took into 
account all aspects of social and economic life and fully reflects the 
diversity or people in all parts of the country was used in developing the 
ANDS.  Considerable effort was made to ensure that sub-national 
consultations (i.e., outside of the central government in the capital Kabul) 
identified the priorities of the Afghan people living in each of the 34 
provinces.  In addition, a comprehensive series of sector and ministry 
strategies were developed to address all aspects of social and economic 
development.  The result of this inclusive process is a national strategy 
that is fully reflective of the aspirations of the Afghan people.  The 
Government is committed to the programs and projects that directly target 
the poorest and most vulnerable groups for assistance.207 
2. Independent Directorate for Local Governance 
Another Afghan-capacity building initiative aimed at making progress at the local 
level is the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and its Afghanistan 
Social Outreach Program (ASOP).  The IDLG was established in August 2007 and its 
goal is to achieve stability and security through improved governance at the sub-national 
level.208  The IDLG has reached out to community leaders, commanders, and mullahs for 
help specifically in the area of security.  The ASOP goes a step further and uses village 
and tribal traditions and structures to address local-level needs.209 Its critics say the 
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focus and tactical application.210  This chapter will later suggest how the PRTs can help 
close this strategic focus to tactical application gap through supporting the Provincial 
Strategic Plans (PSP) and Provincial Development Plans (PDPs).211 
E. APPLICATION OF LESSONS 
The previous chapter listed four macro-level lessons and various related sub-
lessons from CORDS that are applicable to Afghanistan.  These lessons can be applied 
without requiring an extensive analysis and detailed comparison of the two conflicts for 
several reasons.  First off, Vietnam was a case of a classic insurgency and while 
Afghanistan has been referred to as a “hybrid insurgency,” there are basic elements of a 
classical insurgency.212  Secondly, the parallels between the two wars are clearly there.  
For example, in both conflicts: 1) conventional forces relied on high-tech weaponry to 
fight against lighter armed, elusive guerrillas, 2) insurgents perceived the sitting 
government as corrupt and inept, and 3) insurgents were able to take advantage of a 
porous border with a neighboring nation while conventional forces had their hands tied 
due to ROEs.  In addition, most importantly, the real struggle in both Vietnam and 
Afghanistan is over the population. 
Of course, there are obvious differences between the Vietnam War and the current 
campaign in Afghanistan.  The scale of effort in itself is greatly different: the Vietnam 
effort belonged to America compared to the multitude of international actors in 
Afghanistan.  Moreover, Cold War politics drove decisions (rightly or wrongly) during  
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Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, which is obviously not the case in Afghanistan today.  
However, there are significant similarities between the two societies as well as 
similarities between the insurgencies that make lessons from Vietnam applicable. 
All that said, the lessons this thesis presents from CORDS are more about 
streamlining interagency processes rather than recommending an explicit COIN strategy.  
Robert Komer is clear that if there are any lessons to take from Vietnam, it is that it 
“teaches the dangers implicit in taking a past experience as an explicit model for the 
future.”213  Komer also suggests it is easier to generalize “lessons than to learn much 
from our Vietnam experience how best to apply them in practice.  Indeed, this experience 
suggests instead the enormous obstacles involved.”214  This section argues the “enormous 
obstacles” Komer is referring to is our own bureaucratic inertia.  In other words, can 
flexibility be institutionalized or is that an oxymoron?  This thesis proposes there are 
changes that can be made within ISAF and the PRTs that enhance flexibility, but it will 
take a paradigm shift from our operating procedures of the past eight years. 
The four lessons being applied to Afghanistan from CORDS are: 
1. Unity of effort—Unity of effort is critical for a successful COIN 
campaign.  This includes a coordinated civilian-military approach, clear 
command and control lines (aka unity of command) and having a set of 
standard operating procedures. 
2. Right people in the right positions—Leadership matters.  However, a great 
military commander who has been versed in Clausewitzian tactics may not 
be successful in a COIN campaign.  There needs to be a rigorous vetting 
process and cultural training for all positions. 
3. Ownership has to start at the local level—De-centralize the approach and 
focus on the specific needs of the individual villages.  The locals have to 
be involved in the process or whatever progress is achieved will not be 
supported or sustained once the internationals leave. 
4. Sustainable security—The MDG report quote says it best, “development 
without security is unachievable, and security without development is 
meaningless.”215  Above all else, people need to feel safe and secure in 
their environment. 
                                                 
213 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict, 165. 
214 Ibid., 167. 
215 Afghanistan MDG Report 2005. 
 67
For each lesson, there will be a brief reminder of how it was used effectively for the 
CORDS program, relate it to the current situation in Afghanistan supported by examples 
provided from recent commanders of U.S.-led PRTs,216 and then propose how it could be 
implemented. 
1. Unity of Effort 
Pacification efforts in Vietnam attempted pre-CORDS were never able to make a 
significant impact on the battlefield for several reasons.  One, they were not attempted on 
a large enough scale, but more than that, they did not have the support of the military.  It 
was not until all facets of the pacification effort were combined under a single-manager 
and moved under MACV did that start to change. 
The DoD always has and always will have the lion’s share of the resources.  
Participants at a workshop on civil-military relations noted, “Congress sees greater 
political benefit from investing in the military than investing in our foreign affairs 
agencies and as long as they believe the Department of Defense has significant capacity 
to execute stability operations,” the money will be directed towards the DoD.217  With 
the recent publication of FM 3-07, Stability Operations, in October 2008, it is safe to 
assume the money will continue to flow.  In order for the civilian agencies to have any 
meaningful and sustainable effectiveness, it only makes sense to partner up and share 
assets, resources, equipment and even people.  Keeping resources separate causes units to 
operate inefficiently and sometimes even against each other.  In her testimony to the 
Armed Services Committee, Michelle Parker stated during her time as the USAID 
representative on the Jalalabad PRT, she never participated in any planning sessions with 
the battle group who conducted combat operations in her province.  The military did not  
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see the USAID as having a “need to know,” even though the PRTs would often times 
provide humanitarian assistance to a village where a combat mission was just 
conducted.218 
Unfortunately, Parker’s example has been more the rule rather than the exception.  
However, the lack of coordination and misunderstanding of missions is not just a 
military-civilian issue.  Not understanding the PRT’s roles and how and where they fit 
into the overall mission within the different military services make additional challenges 
for the PRTs.  One PRT commander explained in his AAR the direction they received 
from their U.S. Army brigade was to kill the insurgents first, then focus on better 
governance and reconstruction.  He tried to explain his mission was reconstruction, but 
was told all units had to focus on the insurgents.  The outgoing PRT commander at 
Bagram provided another example.  His team was responsible for missions in two 
provinces, but was only manned at the same level of PRTs supporting one province.  For 
five weeks, he was tasked to provide a daily “door checker” at the dining facility 
(DFAC).  He argued with both his Army and Air Force chain of commands that he was 
not manned to perform this additional duty, but was told every unit had to support the 
tasking and provide a body.219  Other commanders said PRTs served as mail clerks, 
cooks, fuel supply specialists, etc., for the entire FOB.220  These examples show the 
complete lack of understanding of the importance of PRTs. PRTs are currently the main 
COIN force and the fact they are performing door checker and mail clerk duties suppose 
U.S. military commanders do not get it. 
Having an unambiguous chain of command that clearly defined the meaning and 
differences of ADCON/OPCON/TACON (and not leave it up to the different services to 
interpret) would undoubtedly solve some of these issues.  Ironically, what was initially 
touted as a strength for the Afghanistan PRTs is now considered an area for 
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improvement.221  According to Robert Perito, the senior program officer in the Center for 
Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, the “entire multinational PRT program 
would benefit from an agreed concept of operations and an effective central coordinating 
authority.”222 
Colonel Lewis G. Irwin provided his perspective on the fragmented processes he 
experienced while leading Focused District Development, a nationwide effort to reform 
the Afghan National Police.  He also had frustration with the multitude of actors involved 
in the decision-making process because they: 
often advocate competing visions for Afghanistan’s future, and too often 
they pursue these visions regardless of decisions or agreements to the 
contrary.  With no one player having enough leverage or authority to 
direct otherwise, this fragmentation leads to incoherence in the collective 
international redevelopment effort in Afghanistan, resulting in a great deal 
of wasted effort and generally ineffective results.  Not surprisingly, the 
Afghans often play one international actor off against the other until they 
find the answer they want.223 
ISAF needs to establish a clear chain of command so it has control over all the 
work of the PRTs, both civilian and military elements.  Currently, civilians answer 
directly back to their capitals versus through military channels because they are not part 
of the ISAF chain of command.  CORDS used a “single-manager concept” to coordinate 
efforts between the military and the civilians.  ISAF needs a “single-manager concept” 
that integrates all elements of the PRT into a unified strategy for Afghanistan.  David 
Galula reinforces the single-manger concept: “More than any other kind of warfare, 
COIN must respect the principle of a single direction.  A single boss must direct the 
operations from beginning until the end.”224  This would also eliminate duplication of 
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effort, ensure a common set of standards were adhered to and promote a singular vision.  
Cooperation and ultimately, success, would depend less on personalities and more on 
SOPs. 
Unfortunately, how organizational charts are interpreted in Kabul do not 
necessarily transition the same way to the rest of Afghanistan.  Multiple PRT 
commanders provided feedback that they did not understand how ISAF fit into their 
hierarchy, that ISAF direction was not communicated down to the field level, and if there 
was conflict between the Army brigade guidance and ISAF guidance, the default was to 
go with the Army guidance.225 
The military services certainly need to get their act together, but they are not the 
only organization that needs some housekeeping.  Currently, there is a huge capabilities 
gap in our USG civilian agencies because they have not been able to keep pace with the 
growth of the DoD.  This has caused a major imbalance in the diplomatic tools available 
to pursue national objectives.226  For instance, during the Vietnam-era there were 
approximately 15,000 employees in USAID.  Today they have approximately 3,000.  The 
DoS currently has 11,000 employees.  A miniscule drop in the bucket compared to the 
DoD’s 2,000,000 uniformed personnel.  When you compare budgets, the Pentagon gets 
almost half a trillion dollars per year compared to the DOS’s FY2010 budget request of 
$16.3 billion.227  On a positive note, the Congressional Budget Justification request has added 
a total of 1,181 positions, (700 Foreign Service staff) and upgraded training capacity in the 
Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, and Urdu languages.228  However, it will be years before these changes 
make any real impact. 
This capabilities gap filters down to the field where it has serious consequences.  
Most U.S.-led PRTs have at least three civilian billets and according to the AARs of the 
previous commanders, there were some rotations where all three billets were unfilled for 
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the entire year.  For those that were filled, some were new hires with no prior experience, 
or they were temporary fills that only served in-country for six months.  This was not the 
case with every civilian.  By in large, most PRT commanders spoke favorably of the 
civilians and the skills they brought to the team and the commanders wished they had 
more of them.  The PRTs that had experienced civilians had too much work for one 
person to accomplish realistically.229 
Referring back to David Galula and his classic COIN strategy, “a revolutionary 
war is 20% military action and 80% political action.  Giving the soldier authority over the 
civilian would thus contradict one of the major characteristics of this type of war.  In 
practice, it would inevitably tend to reverse the relative importance of military versus 
political action and move the counterinsurgent’s warfare closer to a conventional one.”230  
Couple this with President Obama’s Afghan strategy, which is focused on curbing 
corruption, creating jobs, and advancing governance and reconciliation in the provinces 
and districts, it only makes sense for the evolution of stabilization efforts to be civilian-
led PRTs.  The transition to civilian leadership of all PRTs sends a clear signal to the 
Afghan government and people that the U.S. military is not a permanent fixture in 
Afghan society and that improved governance and security will lead to more civilianized 
forms of assistance.  Having civilian-led PRTs would also ensure long-term development 
would be balanced with near-term military objectives.231  Canada and the UK have 
already transitioned their PRTs to civilian leadership and lessons can be learned from 
their experiences.232 
ISAF needs to adopt a similar chain-of-command structure like was used in 
CORDS.  Instead of a military commander in charge of the PRTs, put a civilian in charge 
and give them the responsibility of providing the overall strategic and operational 
guidance.  The senior military officer would serve as the PRT deputy and could supervise 
the military personnel.  To reinforce the chain-of-command concept, civilians would 
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write evaluations on the military personnel they supervised and vice versa.  The civilian 
leader would have access to CERP-type funds and be able to make decisions at their level 
on smaller, quick impact projects. 
At HQ ISAF, there needs to be a small team of both military and civilian advisors 
that work directly for the top civilian who will serve as COMISAF’s deputy for 
stabilization and reconstruction.  ISAF must allow flexibility for PRTs to meet local 
requirements, but there needs to be consistency across the regions.  PRTs need SOPs, but 
they also must preserve the flexibility to work with the local Afghans to determine what 
is needed in their particular area.  De-centralized execution is the key to success.  What is 
a priority need for a district in Patika province may not be the same for a district in Heart.  
The local needs should always drive the priorities for the individual PRTs, not direction 
from ISAF or the national government in Kabul. 
• Re-cap of Unit of Effort sub-lessons 
• All PRTs report to ISAF through “single-manager concept” 
• Clearly define ADCON/OPCON/TACON, leaving nothing up to 
interpretation 
• Civilians lead PRTs 
• Civilian deputy to COMISAF for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
• Civilian deputy has small team at HQ of hand-picked advisors 
• Standardized SOPs with De-centralized execution 
2. Right People in the Right Positions 
Robert Komer knew the only way for pacification to work in Vietnam was to have 
the best people with the right attitude and focus.  He and his small staff carefully vetted 
the civilians and did what they could to work the system in order to get the best military 
officers.  All civilian advisors went through 13-weeks of intensive training and those who 
showed an aptitude for the Vietnamese language stayed longer.  Once CORDS personnel 




He constantly communicated the pacification message and had no qualms about replacing 
those who did not meet his standards.  Those he liked, he created incentives for them to 
stay in their positions longer. 
Today, forces in Afghanistan are still trying to make-up ground for the 
operational mistakes and cultural miscues made in the early stages of the invasion.  U.S. 
forces went in with their sights set on Osama and capture-kill missions were the order of 
the day, re-enforced with massive airstrikes.  Houses were bombed, civilians were killed, 
and as a result, hundreds of new insurgents were created.  U.S. Army Lieutenant General 
Peter Chiarelli stresses that leaders at all levels have to understand how the actions they 
and their subordinates take impact not only the immediate situation, but the local, 
national and international audience.  Everyone has to do a better job of considering the 
second- and third-order effects of their decisions.233 
The initial Afghan strategy was flawed because policy makers did not understand 
the environment they were preparing to operate in or even much about the enemy for that 
matter.  This is not unlike what happened in Vietnam.  Arnold Isaacs wrote, “From start 
to finish, American leaders remained catastrophically ignorant of Vietnamese history, 
culture, values, motives and abilities.  Misperceiving both its enemy and its ally and 
imprisoned in the myopic conviction that sheer military force could somehow overcome 
adverse political circumstances, Washington stumbled from one failure to the next in the 
continuing delusion that success was always just ahead.”234 
A lack of cultural understanding is our Achilles’ heel and it is not just for the 
Americans.  In 2005, Major Andrew Roe of the British Army wrote, “the coalition also 
suffers from a deficiency of cultural awareness, regional knowledge, and local language 
skills.  Ignorance of tribal customs leads to misunderstandings and alienation.  While 
insurgents communicate freely to gain intelligence, PRT members’ inability to speak  
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tribal languages is a barrier to basic understanding and communication.  Language 
difficulty prevents tactical units from establishing working relationships with village 
elders and receiving local intelligence.”235 
U.S.-led PRT military team members attend training at Fort Bragg, NC, prior to 
their deployment.  This only started in February 2006, three years after PRTs first stepped 
foot in Afghanistan.  Before 2006, only PRT commanders attended a two-day course 
before going over.  According to the feedback in the AARs, PRT commanders think there 
is too much emphasis on “shoot-move-communicate” tactics and not nearly enough on 
how to interact with the Afghans, Afghan history, how they operate, cultural sensitivities 
and current Afghan events.  For example, a PRT commander commented some members 
of his team had never heard of Ramadan and did not know what it was about.236  One 
commander was frustrated the pre-deployment training did not discuss Afghan initiatives 
such as IDLG or ASOP.  In fact, he was told all he needed to know about governance in 
Afghanistan he learned in his third grade civics class.237  Also, 100% of the commanders 
said their teams needed more emphasis on COIN and language training.  A few 
commanders took the initiative to use a program like Rosetta Stone to learn phrases in 
Pashto or Dari prior to their arrival, but they were the exception.238 
Continuity and length of deployments were also listed as a problem by the 
outgoing commanders.  For a 12-month deployment, only nine months are spent with 
boots on the ground due to pre-deployment training requirements.  PRT commanders did 
not think this was near enough time in-country.  It takes so much time to familiarize 
oneself with the subtleties of their AOR, learn who the formal and informal leaders are, 
much less establish any sort of relationship with them, get educated on the current 
projects and make contacts, by the time they felt comfortable in their jobs, it was time to  
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go back home.  The commanders all thought they could have wasted less time on their 
initial arrival if they would have had access to information specific to their province 
ahead of time.239 
Continuity would be better served if the PRT core staff rotated individually 
instead of as a whole new team.  PRTs also need extended tour lengths.  Actually, several 
commanders commented on this in their AARs.240  One commander mentioned the local 
leaders know the PRT members are only going to be there for nine months, which is a 
relatively short time.  If they do not get the answer they want from the current team, they 
will wait several months for the new team to arrive and then ask again.241  The Afghans 
have time to wait; the PRT teams do not.  The savvy Afghans know this and continue to 
exploit it.  By staggering core staff deployments, PRTs could stop re-inventing the wheel 
with each new team rotation. 
The core staff members for the PRTs, both civilian and military, need to be 
carefully vetted to ensure they have the right background, previous experiences, and 
attitude for these challenging positions.  Ideally, all PRT members should be screened at 
some level to make sure they have the right mind-set and focus.  Regardless of who is 
going to be in charge (military or civilians), they have to be the best and the brightest.  
Leading PRTs should be viewed as a coveted assignment and there needs to be a rigorous 
selection process.  For civilian leaders, they should have prior leadership experience and 
exposure to working with the military.  PRTs represent the “tip of the spear” in a COIN 
and are the backbone for success in Afghanistan.  PRTs have to be manned with the best 
people because the future of Afghanistan depends on it. 
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General Rupert Smith of the British Army sums it up well with: 
We must develop the confidence to grant authority to those we send to 
conduct these complex operations commensurate with the responsibilities 
laid on their shoulders.  Not the least of these responsibilities is the 
expectation on the political level that they will simply get on with things 
on the ground, regardless of their suitability to the job, the relevance of the 
mandate, or their lack of knowledge of the other forces with whom they 
are to collaborate, in the case of coalitions and multinational deployments.  
This confidence will come only with the selection and training of the right 
people, and achieving this on a multinational basis will be difficult to do 
and will take time.  It will also come only when the political and 
diplomatic level gain a better understanding of the uses and utility of force 
before seeking to use it.  Nevertheless, until this is achieved we will not 
gain the full potential of the deployed forces and resources.242 
• Re-cap of Right People sub-lessons 
• Less training on conventional tactics and more COIN-specific 
methods (i.e., Afghan culture, history, realities on the ground) 
• Language training has to be considered critical training for core 
members of a PRT 
• Staggering rotations of PRT core members would increase 
continuity 
• Lengthen PRT tours to 15-18 months vs. 12 months 
• Vigorous selection process for PRT leaders 
3. Ownership has to Start at the Local Level 
CORDS built viable and responsible political institutions at the local level.  It 
prioritized what was important to the peasant farmers: land reform, rural development, 
and anticorruption measures.  Above all else, Komer stressed it happened with the 
Vietnamese in the lead and at the lowest level possible--the village. 
T. E. Lawrence gave sage advice to British officers working with local Arabs in 
1917.  “We have to be prepared to see them doing things by methods quite unlike our 
own, and less well: but on principle, it is better they half-do it than that we do it perfectly 
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for them.”243  In Afghanistan, the same parable rings true.  In addition, since all Afghan 
politics are tribal, it just makes sense for a localized COIN strategy.244  At its most 
simplified level, it really boils down to this: ask the local people what they need, 
determine the formal and informal leaders, and then help them work towards their 
objectives.  The overall process should always be centered around training the Afghan 
people to do their job.245 
PRTs were intended to work themselves out of a job, but their current model 
minimizes this possibility.  PRTs continue to use international and Afghan contractors to 
carry out reconstruction projects, and although Afghan government offices are involved, 
the projects are managed and executed by international PRT staff.  As a result, the 
Afghan government’s capacity to manage projects and resources at the sub-national level 
remains low.  Making Afghans partners in PRTs is the best way to prepare for Afghan 
management of resources and the sustainability of critical development capabilities. 
The only way to successfully perform “clear-hold-build” operations and really 
partner with local Afghans is to have a continued presence in the districts and villages.  
The State Department’s Chris Mason and Naval Postgraduate School’s Thomas Johnson 
have made the case for changing strategy to focus on the district level for several 
years.246  There is a current proposal from ISAF for the creation of District Support 
Teams (DSTs) to augment PRTs in Afghanistan.  DSTs would operate in the same 
capacity as the PRTs, only down at the district level.  DST members would live among 
the local people, work with them on a daily basis, and establish a level of trust and 
confidence that is needed to truly get things accomplished.  This would be a huge step 
towards making some real, sustainable progress in Afghanistan. 
No doubt, there are challenges to living among the Afghan population.  It is much 
more rural and dispersed, the vast majority of Afghanistan lacks basic infrastructure, and 
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many Afghans live in remote, isolated, and barely accessible valleys.  There is some 
concern that in areas that have been in complete isolation for years, the local population 
is generally hostile to all outsiders, whether friendly or otherwise.  Any outsider trying to 
live and work in these remote areas could create new hostilities.247 
AAR feedback from the PRT commanders is consistent that there has to be more 
Afghan involvement in their processes.  One commander explained how he took a risk 
and placed an Afghan in charge of a local contracting process that had historically been 
U.S.-led.  He received much criticism at first for his decision and was told repeatedly it 
would not work.  However, it ended up being recognized as a “best practice” and under 
consideration by UNAMA for implementation across Afghanistan.248  This example 
proves that Afghans, with the proper support, can handle the responsibilities if we have 
people willing to take risks and put them in charge of areas that are normally led by 
internationals.  Another commander opined with support from a strong Provincial 
governor, the PRTs can work hand-in-hand with local Afghans using the ANDS, PSPs 
and PDPs as guidelines to develop a strategy specific for each province that rebuilds 
Afghanistan from the district up.249 
The major idea for implementation is to form joint Afghan-PRTs/DSTs, with 
Afghans in the lead.  These teams would then identify and help meet the specific needs of 
local populations.  To help re-build the Afghan government’s credibility and prove they 
can support and protect all the people of Afghanistan, the PRTs/DSTs need to continue 
supporting the PSPs and the PDPs, ensuring projects contribute to targets set by the 
ANDS and the MDGs.  That way, it puts an Afghan face up front—an “Afghanization” 
of the effort—and the ISAF partners are in a supporting, behind the scenes role, just like 
it was with CORDS.  Moreover, the final step in the eventual transition to civilian 
leadership of U.S.-led PRTs should be the plan for the transfer of all PRT resources to the 
Afghans.  This would finally complete the cycle and undoubtedly prove the Afghans are 
in charge of their own country and destiny.   
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Another lesson from CORDS is getting rid of government officials who are 
corrupt or inept.  In order for the international community to retain any credibility, it 
cannot continue to tolerate or support corrupt Afghan officials.  Efforts must be taken to 
remove these officials from their positions at all levels of the government.  This sends a 
strong signal to the Afghan people that the international community is serious about good 
governance, transparency and legitimacy. 
Bottom line, for there to be sustainable progress in Afghanistan, the Afghan 
people need to become equal partners and share the responsibility of implementation.  To 
do this, they have to either be a part of the decision-making process or more preferably, 
own the process.  After all, they are the main stakeholders in this entire effort.  What they 
think and want matters. 
• Re-cap of Ownership at Local Level sub-lessons 
• Implementation of local-level DSTs working in-conjunction with 
PRTs 
• Afghans take lead whenever possible—“Afghanization” of efforts 
• Use ANDS, PSPs, and PDPs as guidelines, not as a mandate 
• Get rid of corrupt and inept government officials 
4. Sustainable Security 
Another key feature of the CORDS program was its emphasis on sustained 
security (local clear and hold) as the indispensible first stage of pacification.  CORDS 
utilized the local police and paramilitary forces to provide sustained protection to the 
rural population versus the military’s “search and destroy” operations, which were 
targeted on larger enemy units.  CORDS viewed the under-utilized, paramilitary RF and 
PF as the logical force on which to build.  They were all locally recruited and most were 
volunteers.  They were lightly armed, meaning they were cheap to support, and already 
organized in small territorial units.  RF served only in their own provinces and PF in their 
own districts.  Primary responsibility for security of the local and rural populations 
devolved upon local forces recruited from the population itself.  CORDS put the onus for 
securing the local environment back on the local population. 
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Security is essential to legitimate governance and participation, effective rule of 
law, and sustained economic development.  The absence of security in any environment 
diminishes the trust and confidence of the population in its government, prevents 
meaningful reconstruction, and makes everyone vulnerable to insurgent activities.  The 
COIN field manual specifically directs U.S. forces to make securing the civilian, rather 
than destroying the enemy, their top priority.  One PRT commander captured this 
dilemma in his AAR, stating the National Guard units who normally provided the 
security forces elements for the PRTs had to be reminded their goal was to protect the 
civilians, not shoot the insurgents.250 
In COIN operations, the primary frontline force is often the police.251  
Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s national police force needs more than reform …it needs a 
complete overhaul.  Lewis Irwin writes about the challenges he faced during his year 
working on the nationwide effort to reform the Afghan police.  Irwin saw first-hand how 
corruption is entrenched in and an accepted part of the Afghan culture.  For instance, 
theft committed to feed one’s family is considered acceptable.  “Any effort at 
professionalizing the police would have to take place within a context of abject poverty, 
wide-spread illiteracy, a thriving and well-connected drug trade, porous borders, and an 
almost total absence of the basic elements of rule of law, ranging from criminal 
investigators to lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and jails.”252 
The author’s personal contacts with the ANP are much the same.  From May to 
October 2006 during meetings with local ANP at checkpoints in a twenty-mile radius 
around Bagram AB, police officers lacked equipment, ammunition, basic training, 
uniform items such as boots (some ANP officers were wearing plastic sandals with their 
uniforms) and complained of going several months with no pay.  The ANP at more 
isolated checkpoints were regularly found sleeping or high on hashish.  It was not all  
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negative encounters, though.  There were some professional ANP officers who were very 
proud to be a part of the police force, but they said it would be hard to continue in their 
current position without regular pay. 
The solution for sustainable security in Afghanistan has to start with a bottom-up 
strategy.  Just how CORDS used a localized effort for village security, create a small, 
localized security force that consists of men from the area villages, formed into a mobile 
unit that is willing to fight at a moment’s notice, but cheap to maintain a concept not 
unlike the minutemen of the American Revolution.  Here is also where an Afghan 
specific disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program can have a 
significant impact.  Provide the right incentives for low-level insurgents to re-integrate 
into civilian life, complete with training and a paid position to help protect their village.  
The force would have to be different from the now defunct Afghan National Auxiliary 
Police program that was created in 2006 and provided ten days of training and $70 a 
month to anyone who owned a gun.253  It is important to find a way to fill the security 
gap, but not create more security problems by taking short-cuts.  CORDS placed regional 
and local paramilitary groups under province and district chiefs.  The local Afghan militia 
forces could fall under control of the district chiefs and in even more remote areas, the 
village elders. 
The common theme between this section and the previous one is it all starts at the 
local level and the DST concept is their way ahead.  International police and military 
trainers/mentors should be embedded with the DSTs and would have a significant role, 
working with the ANA and ANP, and overseeing the local and regional forces as well.  It 
is crucial the mentors and trainers are not imposing Western models on ANSF personnel, 
or training Afghans in the mirror-image of the service they belong to.  The Afghans need 
training relevant for their operating environment.  The ANSF has to take the lead for 
local security with the international police and military trainers/mentors working side-by-
side with them, 24/7.  Once security is steady and reliable in every district, Afghans can 
stop surviving and start living. 
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Thinking outside the proverbial box of Western security, in tandem with 
implementing the DSTs, policy makers need to consider what role the village elders and 
the traditional tribal codes and structures will play in the Pashtun tribal areas.254  The 
term “ungoverned spaces” is often used to describe regions within a country where the 
rule of law is weak.255  Pashtun tribal areas are often label “ungoverned” by outsiders.  
However, as Professor Johnson argues, this is by no means the case.  The absence of 
Western structures of governance has allowed “complex and sophisticated conflict-
resolution mechanisms, legal codes, and alternative forms of governance” to develop.256  
If the DSTs reach out to the village elders, promoting their importance as on the same 
level as the mullahs and the government officials, and initially allow the traditional jirga 
system to handle low-level disputes, we will take one step closer to the ultimate goal in a 
COIN struggle: the population. 
• Re-cap of Security sub-lessons 
• Security is the lynchpin for any future development 
• Develop a local/regional force to augment the ANP and ANA 
• Embed military and police trainers/mentors with the DSTs 
• NSFs have to be lead on security at the local levels 
• Afghan tribal systems and structures have to play a role 
F. SUMMARY 
Although the scale and historical circumstances of Vietnam differ from 
Afghanistan, the interagency cooperation and coordination efforts in Vietnam hold 
critical lessons.  The lessons CORDS provides has nothing to do with how to fight a 
conventional war, but more how to defeat an insurgency through proper organizational 
structure.  Just like in Vietnam, the agencies in Afghanistan responsible for political and 
economic development need the armed forces to protect them from insurgents in the 
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areas they are trying to work.  Colby described the problem in Vietnam prior to CORDS: 
“You’d find the U.S. civilians resettling villagers in one place, while the military was 
putting a defense force in a different place where there weren’t any villagers.  It didn’t 
make any sense.  You needed to have the defense force, the self-defense force, the 
elections, the tin and cement to build houses, and the propaganda support as one program 
for a village.”257  Unity of effort is critical to success! 
In Afghanistan, ISAF has to use its limited resources in the most efficient and 
effective way possible.  By adopting a single-manager concept, ISAF would ensure the 
international community is speaking with one voice through its COIN strategy to the 
Afghan people. 
Strong processes and consistent SOPs are one thing, but having the right people in 
the PRT jobs ensures they are carried our correctly.  We also have to do a better job at 
understanding the local terrain, the Afghan people, and their various and distinct 
backgrounds.  David Kilcullen writes:  
There is no substitute for understanding this cultural terrain: we cannot 
defeat the insurgency unless we understand what drives it.  But we must 
be keenly aware of the limits of our ability to “play” in this tribal game.  
Rather than meddling ourselves, we must use our knowledge to build, 
support and enable trusted Afghan partners whose grasp of these dynamics 
is instinctive.  We must seek a form of indirect influence through trusted 
intermediaries, rather than applying too direct an approach.  This may 
seem a neo-colonialist approach, until it is remembered that while 
colonialism was exploitative and was intended to be permanent, this is a 
temporary expedient only and is a means to deliver Afghans the assistance 
promised by the international community, only until such time as they can 
handle their own problems without such assistance.258 
For a COIN to be successful, there has to be an explicit strategy for winning the 
trust and confidence of the local population.  The only way to do this is by providing 
them security they can rely on and transferring ownership of programs to the lowest level 
possible.  Currently, operations in Afghanistan are managed at the provincial level.  Only 
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operations that are de-centralized and pushed down to the local level (i.e., district and 
village) will create an environment for steady and sustainable security, meaningful work 
with the local populace, and prohibit the insurgents to operate. 
Two key reforms that could effectively build Afghan government capacity at the 
local level and incentivize officials to take reform seriously are increasing Afghan 
government involvement in PRT/DST activities and transitioning to civilian leadership of 
PRTs/DSTs.  As the provincial and district authorities demonstrate capacity to manage 
resources, PRTs/DSTs can begin to allocate resources to provincial/district governments 
for reconstruction projects.  These two initiatives will ensure the sustainability of critical 
development capabilities in the Afghan government.  Over time, as security conditions 
permit, the military personnel in PRTs/DSTs will withdraw, and Afghan and international 
civilians will assume responsibility for directing development assistance to the Afghan 




Now more than ever, the international community must find a way to protect the 
Afghan population while increasing the legitimacy of the Afghan government.  
Undoubtedly, Afghanistan presents its own unique set of circumstances and challenges, 
but this thesis makes the case that there are lessons from CORDS that can maximize our 
efforts in the realm of COIN and stability operations through unity of effort, finding and 
keeping the right people, pushing ownership down to the local level, and sustainable 
security.  Sustainable security is arguably the most important lesson of all because 
without security, there cannot be meaningful development. 
Just like in Vietnam, a conventional military strategy is not the solution for 
Afghanistan.  CORDS unified the various pacification efforts in Vietnam, bringing them 
under a single manager and finally making them a priority for the military commanders.  
In Afghanistan, the PRTs are experiencing the same command and control difficulties the 
myriad of pacification efforts did pre-CORDS.  Despite the lack of any unified, strategic 
guidance, military units are finding ways to be successful at the local level.  These 
individual units are waging an ad hoc war, coming up with innovative ideas and 
ingenious ways to stabilize their local area of responsibility.  Unfortunately, this will not 
be enough for us to win the larger war in Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan needs a common, over-arching strategy for COIN and stability 
operations.  This will provide an integrated, coordinated theory for victory at the strategic 
level.  Meanwhile, the tactical and operational units need the flexibility to tailor the 
implementation of the strategy so it meets the specific needs of their local area.  The end 
goal should always result in the Afghan people assuming responsibility for their own 
development and security.  For any of our efforts to succeed in the long term, they have 




The previous chapter offered recommendations on how to apply the lessons of 
CORDS to Afghanistan.  Specifically with the creation of the District Support Teams, the 
focus has to be concentrated at the local level and use a bottom-up approach.  The 
following three policy recommendations enhance the proposals made in the previous 
chapter. 
A.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Locals First 
Afghans have to view this struggle as their own, not as belonging to the 
international community.  At every opportunity, Afghans have to be in the lead.  With 
this, the Afghan government has to ensure it is able to hire and retain its country’s best 
minds by providing the right incentives.  Another idea is employ a type of Civilian 
Conservation Corps or Works Progress Administration across Afghanistan.  This would 
get people back to work, provide them much needed skills training, and give them a sense 
of pride and ownership by allowing them to work on projects that they and their families 
will benefit from.  The only concern is to ensure wages and benefits for these types of 
programs are commensurate with jobs of equal value in the Afghan economy. 
2. Education for All Afghans 
Education is a fundamental cornerstone for peace and stability, democracy, good 
governance, poverty reduction and economic growth.259  The future of Afghanistan 
depends on educating both its young boys and girls.  By educating females, women and 
girls obtain the ability and skills to effectively contribute to the well-being of their 
families and participate in their local community.  In societies like Afghanistan where 
women are responsible for the management of their household and for food preparation, 
their health and awareness of hygiene, nutrition, and basic health and first aid practices 
directly impacts not only their own well-being, but also that of the children and men in 
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their families.260  Due to their role in the family, women are critical conduits of 
information about basic health care and teach new values to their children.261  Education 
is by no means a quick fix, but rather a long-term goal and an investment in 
Afghanistan’s future.  It will offer new opportunities for future generations of Afghans. 
3. Metrics 
The U.S. and ISAF have to first define success, and then find a way to measure it.  
We cannot continue to measure progress by using self-assessments and highlighting what 
we know we are already good at doing.  There has to be a balance between objectivity 
and subjectivity.  A practical system should contain elements of both.  Also, an 
individual’s performance report should not be based on these progress reports alone.  As 
long as this is the case, field commanders will continue to inflate numbers and only report 
on the positive changes in their AOR, glossing over trouble spots, which is where the 
focus really needs to be.  Another option to consider is an unbiased, independent third 
party to serve as a watchdog for dishonest reporting.262 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis, like most others, has probably raised more issues than it has 
answered.  The following areas are important factors for Afghanistan that were not 
explored in the thesis. 
1. Focus on Agriculture 
In Afghanistan, 80% of the population live in rural areas and rely on subsistence 
farming.  Helping them grow more food will improve the quality of their lives.  Richard 
Holbrooke has said previous campaigns that focused on eradicating poppy crops were a 
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waste of money and “a benefit to the enemy.  We were recruiting Taliban with our tax 
dollars.”263  By helping Afghans improve food production, it will reverse a sense of 
hopelessness that contributed to the Taliban recruitment.  Holbrooke continued with, 
“They need the kind of soup-to-nuts agriculture support that Roosevelt gave farmers 
during the Great Depression—roads, markets, irrigation, seeds, fertilizer, educational 
materials.  Afghans are smart farmers, they just need the right kind of help from us.”264  
Farming programs can also help revive the economy by growing what other nations want 
to import: pomegranates, almonds, pistachios, raisins, and fruits such as apricots that can 
be dried or turned into juice.265  The Agribusiness Development Teams manned by state-
based Army National Guard units need to be expanded.266 
2. Regional Approach 
Afghanistan’s security is ultimately linked to its regional partners.267  Therefore, 
in order for Afghanistan to stabilize, it will take a concerted effort from its neighbors, 
specifically Pakistan.  The swath of land around the ill-defined Durand Line, especially to 
the East, has to be monitored and controlled.  Since the eastern area is sovereign territory 
of Pakistan, it is imperative this space is not allowed to continue as a safe haven for 
extremist groups.  Richard Holbrooke and General David Petraeus both agree the Central 
Asian states, India, Iran, China, and Russia all need to be factored into the regional 
approach to securing Afghanistan.268  The overriding need is for a common purpose, 
clear direction and agreed upon goals.  Success can eventually be achieved only if the 
Afghan people, their neighbors, and the international community take ownership and 
responsibility of the problem. 
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These two areas are specific to Afghanistan, but the third suggestion would affect 
future nation-building efforts.  Preparing our military and civilian agencies for nation-
building is a daunting task that requires a delicate balance of skills.  Lieutenant General 
Peter W. Chiarelli states: 
To meet the national security challenges of the future, we must create the 
capacity to engage in the full range of military and interagency operations, 
and must embrace the concept of nation-building, not just rhetorically, but 
entirely.  The potential to lose the momentum of change in this emerging 
reality of conflict through the diffusion of funding, political positioning 
that takes a short-term view, and the natural reluctance of our forces to 
intellectually engage beyond the linear construct of warfare is real.  
Additionally, while we attempt to improve our capabilities in non-linear 
warfare, we must maintain our ability to defeat conventional military 
threats and deter the emergence of near-peer competitors.  The challenge 
is to find the right balance without trying to attain competence in so many 
potential missions that we can’t do any of them well.269 
3. Participate in UN Peacekeeping Missions 
Since the 1993 Blackhawk down debacle in Somalia, the United States has chosen 
to send a sparse number of troops to support UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
missions.270  The U.S. has decided instead to bare the monetary burden271 rather than 
risking U.S. service member lives in corners of the world that do not have any significant 
relevance to U.S. national interests.  However, UN peacekeeping missions do a variety of 
tasks that U.S. forces are routinely called upon to perform, but usually in a more 
permissive environment.  For instance, UN peacekeepers are involved in conflict 
mediation, setting up and running DDR programs, monitoring elections, rebuilding 
national police forces, and working with a multitude of civilian agencies.  These are very 
complex operations that require a diversity of skills.  U.S. forces would get the chance to 
manage everything from political and diplomatic efforts, humanitarian missions, 
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intelligence gathering on the local conditions, and economic development all while 
maintaining the proper security conditions.  U.S. forces routinely find themselves doing 
these types of tasks for the first time in a combat environment.  If they participated in UN 
peacekeeping missions, they could get hands-on experience in nation-building activities 
for the first time in a more permissive environment.  Moreover, U.S. forces would be able 
to work side-by-side with individuals (both military and civilian) who have done these 
types of activities before. 
C. SUMMARY 
The mission in Afghanistan needs a clear direction and goals, with open and 
honest information flow to the Afghan people.  The ultimate objective is to empower the 
Afghan people in order to strengthen their governance and fight extremism and 
corruption on their own terms. 
We need our best and brightest focusing on ways to stabilize and build 
Afghanistan from the bottom-up and more importantly, getting the Afghan people 
involved.  This thesis proposes we do not have to start from scratch.  CORDS was a 
successful COIN and stability operations program in our past that we can implement 
fundamental ideas from before we are too far gone in Afghanistan.  As the George 
Santayana adage goes: “Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”  
One Vietnam in our history is enough.  It is time we learn from it. 
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